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Zusammenfassung 
 
Der in China beginnende Motorisierungsprozess führt zwangsläufig zu einer Konfrontation mit 
den Umwelt- und Ressourcenkonflikten, die mit der erdölbasierten Automobiltechnologie des 
vergangenen Jahrhunderts Hand in Hand gehen. Dadurch würde sich zum einen die gegenwärtig 
problematische Erdölenergiebilanz des Landes durch erhöhten CO²-Ausstoß verschärfen. Zum 
anderen würde der Aufbau einer chinesischen automobilen Infrastruktur auf Erdölbasis, die 
Ressourcenknappheit in diesem Sektor, die globalen Umweltprobleme und die Sicherung der 
weltweiten Energiebilanz negativ beeinflussen.  
Eine realistische Alternative für China ist ein Quantensprung auf dem Gebiet der 
Automobiltechnologie zu vollziehen und in Wasserstoffmotoren zu investieren. China kann mit 
einer Automobilwirtschaft auf der Basis einer Wasserstofftechnologie die durch 
Erdölverbrennung geschaffenen Umweltprobleme umgehen. Dieser Artikel untersucht das 
Potential Chinas zu einem solchen Quantensprung in der Automobiltechnologie. Ein wesentlicher 
Aspekt ist die Prüfung der Energiebilanz Chinas in den Jahren 1990-2000, die es ermöglicht den 
Energieverbrauch und die Produktion auf Quellenbasis internationaler Organisationen und 
wissenschaftlicher Arbeiten, zueinander in ein Verhältnis zu setzen. Die Energiebilanz der 
einzelnen Sektoren Atomkraft, Kohle, Erdöl und Erdgas wird analysiert und vergleichend werden 
die zukünftigen Trends prognostiziert. Für die Implementation von Wasserstofftechnologie ist die 
Verfügbarkeit und Nutzung von Energieressourcen von zentraler Bedeutung. Eine Analyse der 
Energiebilanz ist daher die Grundlage für eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Einschätzung des 
Potentials Chinas zu einem solchen technologischen Quantensprung. 
Abstract 
 
As a country beginning its motorization process, China must confront the problems attached to an 
oil-based car society. In adopting the conventional automobile technology, the country would 
aggravate an already unstable, domestic oil balance while pushing up increasing carbon dioxide 
levels. Not only would domestic problems emerge, but international concerns regarding oil 
shortage, global pollution, and the energy security balance would also result from China erecting 
a traditional automotive infrastructure. One viable alternative the country can consider is a 
leapfrog towards hydrogen technology. By using hydrogen as the fuel source and investing in a 
hydrogen-based car society, China could overstep the problems created by an oil-based 
infrastructure. Examining China’s potential for undertaking this technology leapfrog also calls for 
an investigation of China’s energy past and future. China’s energy balance and energy resources 
play a crucial role in determining the country’s leapfrogging possibility. This paper analyzes one 
facet in China’s energy balance by scrutinizing energy expenditures between 1990-2000. By 
looking at data compiled from major international and academic sources, an overview of China’s 
past energy consumption and production activities is presented. Patterns and discrepancies in 
Chinese coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear production are unveiled and the trends considered in 
relation to the country’s energy balance. Each energy sector is analyzed separately for 
consumption and production trends. Because implementation of hydrogen technology is 
governed by energy resource availability and energy use patterns, such an energy analysis 
provides an appropriate background from which China’s leapfrogging potential can be evaluated. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Project Description 
This paper, along with other specific WZB discussion papers,1 is written under the auspices 
of the cooperation project “Hydrogen Technology for China’s Automobile Leapfrog.” The paper 
also connects to a previously published discussion paper exploring China’s past energy 
expenditures, offering present and future perspectives to China’s energy balance. 
1.2 Study Overview 
China’s future development is often coupled with the notion of economic growth and 
technology improvements, but the country’s financial and technological growth is not self-
contained. External factors also shape the process of realizing economic and financial success. 
Technology advances and financial growth are, in part, products of industrial success. In order to 
increase industry production and introduce technology innovations, the country must focus not 
only on factories and research development, but must also consider development in connection to 
the energy balance. China’s growing economy is currently placing the most stress on the 
domestic energy supply and this economic growth is inevitably hinged on the country’s energy 
supply. When energy supply development fails to keep pace with the mounting needs stemming 
from a growing economy, the country’s economic growth would stall in the wake of an energy 
shortage. According to Fortune magazine, the Chinese government is not unaware of this 
connection between energy and economic growth, “China’s leaders know that in the long run, 
failure to come to grips with rising energy needs will jeopardize growth” (Fortune, February 
2004). In the last decade, the industry sector played a large role in defining China’s energy 
balance, with the transportation sector slowly emerging as another pressure point against China’s 
energy supply. As car prices fall and ownership interest rises, the transportation sector will figure 
more centrally into China’s energy development. Already, private car sales in the country’s 
largest cities have grown by 55% last year, so in the next 10 to 15 years, road transport will serve 
as the “single most important factor driving China’s increasing demand for oil” (Fortune, 
February 2004 & Andrews-Speed, Liao, and Danreuther 2002). China’s energy balance, 
especially the country’s oil expenditures, will be heavily affected by China’s automotive 
development. Not only are foreign automakers conscious of the expanding private car market, but 
global businesses, such as the American food chain, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), also 
forecasts China’s debut as an automobile nation through its marketing strategies. Last year, the 
fast food chain opened the country’s first drive-through restaurant in Beijing (New York Times 
November 24, 2003). The drive-through restaurant can be viewed as a symbol of a car-oriented 
nation since such a structure is only feasible in a car-oriented environment.  So, KFC’s decision 
                                                 
1  The following discussion papers have been written for project purposes: 
1. Zhu (2003): Leapfrogging into Hydrogen Technology: China’s 1990- 2000 Energy Balance 
2. Brie, Pietzcker (2004): NGOs in China – Die Entwicklung des Dritten Sektors 
3. Weider, Metzner, Rammler (2004): Das Brennstoffzellen-Rennen. Aktivitäten und Strategien bezüglich 
Wasserstoff und Brennstoffzelle in der Automobilindustrie 
4. Weider (2004): China – Automobilmarkt der Zukunft? Wie nachhaltig und zukunftsorientiert sind die 
Strategien der internationalen Automobilindustrie in China? 
The above listed papers are written as part of the project exploring hydrogen options in China’s advancing 
motorization, which is financed by project partner the BMW Group.  
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to introduce a car influence into China’s eating culture signals the possible integration of the 
automobile in the daily lives of Chinese citizens. More importantly, the opening of drive-through 
restaurants in China hints at the speed in which China’s culture will be developed. By building 
such restaurants now, China’s automobile society can not be so far off. The Chinese government 
also hints at expectations for wider car ownership via its city-planning strategies. Shanghai 
intends to decentralize the city by moving housing and industry away from the city center. Such 
an intention is suggested by the city’s heavy investments in rail and road infrastructure (Zhou and 
Sperling 2001). By placing priority on road construction and suburbia-oriented housing, the city 
anticipates an increase in commuter-based traffic, thereby also suggesting expansion in the city’s 
car culture.  
 
                                      
 
While the country considers structural details, such as road construction, in the context of 
establishing an automotive infrastructure, China’s emergence as a car-based country cannot only 
be considered in terms of economics or infrastructure. Other effects, mainly the country’s energy 
balance, must also be accounted for. The relationship between energy, economy, and technology 
advancement is inevitably intertwined. Although the Chinese government has made efforts to 
minimize the link between economic growth and energy consumption in the form of falling 
energy intensities, the connection between energy use and China’s growing economy remains 
nonetheless in tact. Jean-Marie Bourdaire, on behalf of the IEA 2050 energy forecast, listed three 
stable, worldwide energy demand trends: electricity use and fuel input for power generation; 
fossil fuels for transport; and fossil fuels for heating buildings and industrial processes (1999). In 
conjunction with these energy trends, Bourdaire mentions that “fuels used for these three services 
have closely followed the track of economic activity” (1999). While the degree to which energy 
and economy is connected has been a point of debate among energy experts,2 China’s current 
condition reveals a symbiosis between energy and economy. Beyond the energy/economy link, 
technology improvements, particularly automotive technology, play a role in energy consumption 
and economic growth. In this light, a complex, triangular correlation between energy, economy, 
and a growing car society exists. Because “technology is the key determinant of economic 
                                                 
2  Wankeun Oh and Kihoon Lee in their article for Energy Economics indicate: “Even though the relationship 
between energy consumption and economic growth has been the subject of intense research over the past three 
decades, the empirical evidence is ambiguous.” John Asafu-Adaye also acknowledges problems in determining a 
consistent pattern between energy and economy. Asafu-Adaye, though attributes this to the differences in 
methodological approaches taken to measure the energy/economy relationship.  
Automobiles
Economy   Energy 
 9
development and is essential for raising standards of living…,” the development of an automotive 
infrastructure reflects the growth of an economy fueled by energy resources (OECD 1999). But 
the relationship between technology advancement and economic expansion is not one sided, since 
a country’s economic state is one mechanism fueling or depressing technology improvements. 
Economic growth also stimulates car ownership. A growing economy translates into more 
prosperous family incomes which ultimately generates customers for the car market. The 
relationship between the economy and technology improvement, namely in the form of the 
automobile is further entangled by the energy factor. As a consequence to growth in China’s 
transport sector, energy demand rates, especially for oil, also rise. This deepens the connection 
between energy, economy, and automobiles. More importantly, the availability of energy 
resources determines the dimensions of China’s automotive infrastructure, a consequence 
influencing the number and type of cars present in the country, thereby directing economic 
progress.  
Were every Chinese family to possess a car, the country would inevitably drain its oil 
supply and create added pressure on a diminishing world supply. A survey conducted in 2000 by 
the Association of Chinese Customers found that three out of five urban Chinese families plan to 
buy a car in the next five years. While this figure is not yet comparable to the one car for every 
family notion, the survey results nonetheless emphasize the importance Chinese families, and by 
default the Chinese population, place on private car ownership (www.china.org.cn). Chen Hong, 
general manger of Shanghai GM estimates that in the next decade, 100 million families will own 
an automobile (Bike Biz September 22, 2004). Were such a figure to manifest into reality, the 
strain on an already sluggish oil production capacity would certainly perpetuate more oil imports. 
Already, China’s oil reserves cannot fulfill the oil demands of a country supporting such a large 
population. Since 1993, China has relied on imported oil. For instance, in 2001, one-third of 
China’s oil demand was filled by foreign oil (Wu 2003). Reliance on external oil supplies will 
grow if China undertakes a full-scale motorization process. While the country’s oil fields 
produced sizeable amounts of oil in the past, oil supplies in these mature fields are diminishing. 
Unless substantial oil fields are discovered, a gasoline powered, automotive infrastructure would 
inexorably exhaust the country’s oil supply, making China an entirely oil importing country. 
Such a position would financially deplete the country and heighten China’s political vulnerability 
to oil rich countries. The country’s incapacity to sustain itself also damages political security, 
resulting in weaker political decision-making power. On an international level, China’s massive 
oil imports would drain an already shrinking fossil fuel supply, enhancing international tensions 
caused by the energy crisis. Since the mid 1990’s China has placed a priority on addressing the 
economic and political risks linked to heavy reliance on foreign oil and gas supplies (Andrews-
Speed, Liao, and Danreuther 2002). This is suggested by the country’s aggressive search for 
international oil and gas sources. This year, China pulled ahead of Japan to be ranked as the 
world’s second largest oil importer. The country’s need for energy resources, especially oil and 
natural gas can be reflected by increased diplomatic and investor presence in the Middle East, 
Australia, and even in countries stymied by U.S. sanctions such as Sudan and Angola (Newsweek 
May 3, 2004). While the Chinese government makes efforts to maximize domestic energy output 
and diversify foreign import sources, another means to preserving political stability and 
equalizing the country’s oil and gas imbalance would be to adopt energy-efficient technology. 
This strategy suitably fits into the development of Chinese automobile technology. Since the 
automotive sector is forecasted to place the heaviest burden on China’s oil balance, adopting 
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alternative, leapfrogging technology in the automobile sector may be one option that releases 
pressure from the country’s over-taxed energy balance.  
Whether exploring China’s potential for establishing leapfrog technology or considering a 
conventional route, the energy factor must be taken into consideration. Energy data from the last 
decade show a heavy dependence on coal and a reduction in oil supply.3 In the past ten years, 
China reduced its coal reliance by promoting and using energy-efficient technology or by 
substituting coal with oil, natural gas, or nuclear energy. Yet, coal continues to remain a main 
source in the energy balance. Oil demand and production grew from 1990 to 2000, but domestic 
consumption was fulfilled through external supplements. An examination of past energy patterns 
is only one part of the energy question since understanding China’s future energy balance is a 
necessary component of the framework used to evaluate the country’s potential for supporting a 
hydrogen-centric car culture. So, this paper looks at China’s future energy expenditures from 
2005-2020. The next two decades are crucial years for China’s automobile infrastructure. As in 
all leapfrogging strategies, the “window of opportunity” to adopt innovative technology is 
limited. Already, China is shifting economic and structural gears, anticipating an increase in 
private-car ownership. The country’s automotive sector will heavily define China’s energy 
balance, so it is reasonable, when looking at the feasibility of a leapfrog technology, to also look 
at possible energy conditions against which this technology can be developed.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
The paper analyzes China’s energy scenarios from 2005 to 2020. Future coal, oil, natural 
gas, and nuclear production and consumption data serve as the central sectors for analysis. Using 
scenarios gathered from government, academic, and international sources, an overview to 
China’s future energy expenditures is presented. Forecasted data for production and consumption 
from each energy sector are separately compared for trends or discrepancies. Scenario structure 
and predictions concerning energy policy or structure developments are described and connected 
to the energy data. While this paper does not identify the most relevant or accurate scenario 
describing China’s energy development, it will provide an overview to the future by examining 
existing patterns and differences between the scenarios. Such an overview can be provided by 
raising questions about how scenarios differ in data predictions and by considering different 
approaches to scenario building. 
This paper bridges the past energy trends discussed in the discussion paper entitled: 
“Leapfrogging into Hydrogen Technology: China’s 1990- 2000 Energy Balance,” with possible 
future outcomes in the energy balance. The question of whether energy patterns from the last 
decade carry into the future can be considered by looking at past trends together with forecasted 
patterns. For logistical reasons, the year 2000 is chosen as the connecting point, since the data 
from the previous paper ends in 2000. When possible, charts detailing energy activities for the 
next two decades begin with data from the year 2000. In this way, a link is built so that past, 
current, and future data can be examined. Because some, but not all scenario studies (1999 is 
another well used reference year) use 2000 as the base year against which future energy data is 
                                                 
3  See WZB Discussion Paper: Zhu (2003): Leapfrogging into Hydrogen Technology: China’s 1990- 2000 Energy 
Balance. 
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modeled, using 2000 as the start year proves to be entirely possible. For logistical reasons, 2000 
is chosen as the connecting point since data in this paper are presented in five year increments, 
beginning in 2005 and ending in 2020. In order to preserve this time pattern, all charts in the data 
analysis section will begin with 2000 data. As previously mentioned, not all studies use 2000 data 
for energy modeling and therefore, not all sources provide data from 2000. For this paper, 2000 
energy data is taken from all scenario studies using 2000 as reference year. Although such an 
approach excludes data from other base years, it is sufficient that a link between past and future 
energy patterns is developed as enough scenario studies utilize 2000 as base year. Since this 
paper chiefly outlines possible outcomes in China’s future energy balance, forecasted data are the 
primary focus. From this perspective, numerical figures from 2005 – 2020 are documented in the 
appendix, while data from 2000 to 2020 are displayed in chart form.  
 
2.2 Methodological Structure 
While the energy question is mainly considered from a quantitative angle, the methodology 
used for scenario building as well as the models predicting changes in policy or infrastructure are 
also presented. Structurally, this paper is modeled along the text written by Jonathan E. Sinton 
and Jean Y. Ku, entitled, “Energy and Carbon Scenarios for China: A Review of Previous Studies 
and Issues for Future Work.” But the perspective against which scenarios are considered and the 
intent for which this paper is written ultimately diverges from work completed by Sinton and Yu. 
For Sinton and Yu, the scenario reviews serve as background for which a new scenario 
development project has been initiated. So the scenario review is used to consider benefits and 
problems of various scenario building approaches and by doing so, the authors can identify 
research elements relevant to the new scenario building project. Instead of using the already-
developed scenarios as a springboard for scenario construction, this paper is intended to serve as 
an overview to China’s future energy trends. The energy forecasts are not analyzed for scenario 
development purposes, rather, the forecasts are scrutinized for future energy trends. In this case, 
emphasis is placed on data analysis and the possible variations on China’s future energy balance. 
This paper acts as one of many structural elements used to develop scenarios examining the 
feasibility of a hydrogen-based automotive infrastructure in China. In this light, energy data 
functions as this paper’s most integral element.  
 
2.3 Sources 
This glance into China’s energy future is specifically taken from a set of non-Chinese, 
lenses. A collection of international forecasts serves as a relevant comparison point for examining 
domestic, Chinese scenarios. And due to the questionable nature of Chinese data, international 
statistics are also needed as a supplement or balance to domestic numbers. A February 2004 
article in Fortune magazine pointed to the problematic energy sector forecasts developed by city 
planners, especially in the power generation sector: “…planners have consistently misjudged 
demand, forecasting a 5% rise in electricity usage last year when actual growth jumped 15%.” 
From this perspective, international sources may serve as an effective counterpoint to Chinese 
data sources. Due to differences in methodological practices and more rigid energy calculation 
guidelines, international predictions of China’s future energy balance may significantly differ 
from domestic forecasts. In this case, the relevancy of domestic data may be called into question, 
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compelling a re-interpretation of Chinese-based figures. For instance, Thomas G. Rawski uses 
international data sources as a means to examine the reliability of Chinese GDP statistics. By 
comparing international data with domestic data, Rawski shows the implausibility of Chinese 
growth estimates. International energy forecasts can serve a similar purpose when domestic 
energy predictions are analyzed. Non-Chinese predictions can be used to verify or to disprove 
domestic energy projections. Jonathan E. Sinton and David G. Fridley successfully argue that 
China’s energy statistics remain important data sources: “official statistics are not necessarily 
always accurate; of course, they are an irreplaceable starting point for analyzing a national energy 
system” (2003). But in the process of acknowledging the place Chinese data holds for our 
understanding of the country’s energy balance, Sinton and Fridley also point out the need for 
caution when interpreting Chinese statistics: “For some analytical purposes, the public sources 
are insufficient, and some commercial information providers exist that can fill in some of the 
gaps” (2001). Cross-checking Chinese data with other indicators is one means through which 
international statistics are utilized for analytical purposes. Sinton and Fridley do not refer to 
forecasted energy data when discussing Chinese energy statistics, but it can be justly assumed 
that the same degree of prudence and same considerations for validity must be exercised when 
considering Chinese energy forecasts. Although most international sources use official Chinese 
data to generate their energy figures, the modeling systems designed by non-Chinese studies are, 
in general, clearer and more accurate than the methodology adopted by domestic studies. 
Analysts using Chinese data must also take false or inconsistent data reporting into consideration 
when using Chinese sources. From these standpoints, international data sources serve as an 
appropriate counter-balance, since data generated by international sources make adjustments for 
inaccuracy or inconsistency of the Chinese data.  Data collection is a main component of 
quantitative analysis. Traditional data collecting strategies such as through academic publications 
found in book and journal form were taken, but data sources from non-academic organizations 
such as international yearbooks were also accessed. Many organizations and academic sources 
publish statistical data in print form and as electronic databases, so the internet and digital data in 
CD-ROM form also served as important data collecting points. While sound methodology is 
crucial for data reliability, not all the scenarios presented in this paper offer precise 
methodological descriptions. A few of the energy forecasts presented in this paper were used as a 
vehicle through which other issues were discussed. So the energy scenarios in these studies were 
not end products themselves, but rather a means to an end. In such cases, the authors placed less 
emphasis on describing the methodology for energy forecasts since the energy data are not the 
main focal point. This does not mean that the energy data lack a clear methodological basis, it 
suggests instead, that forecasted energy data were used to substantiate another point. These 
energy forecasts are nonetheless included in this paper. Because this paper seeks to present an 
international overview to China’s energy future, it is essential that many perspectives towards 
energy expenditures are incorporated here, especially since an overview functions as a broad and 
comprehensive survey. All prominent international forecasts are conducted along clear, 
scientifically-based methodologies, but data from these sources usually fall into similar 
production and consumption patterns. Despite the difference in methodological approaches taken 
by these international scenario developers, such agencies often use the same sources for 
developing forecasted data. As a consequence, data from major international forecasts may be 
quite homogenous. Since this paper intends to present an overview to China’s energy activities, it 
is necessary that the perspective towards energy consumption and production is a multi-
perspective one. So, the inclusion of studies without a direct energy focus is not unacceptable as 
these scenarios may enhance data range. This strategy is justified since this paper intends not to 
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determine the most viable scenario describing China’s future energy expenditures, rather it 
attempts to present the widest possible overview. Since energy is not the primary focus of studies 
missing an explicit methodological section, the energy topic may be approached from a different 
angle, providing varying considerations to China’s energy balance. 
Because the paper compares data from a consecutive period in China’s future, from 2005 to 
2020, only sources presenting data covering the entire analysis period were included in the 
investigation. Although many existing sources offer single data points, these sources were 
excluded from this study. This paper examines potential trends or patterns in China’s future 
energy balance. In order to effectively indicate these trends, a set of data in a single time series 
from the same source is required. Trends are not distinguishable from single data points, nor are 
they easily discovered by many single data points from separate sources. Patterns are best 
discerned using a complete data series from the same source since such data are developed out of 
the same methodological approach. Also, the very definition of an energy trend/pattern calls for 
consecutive data points. Because single pieces of data pulled from different modeling systems 
and chronologically combined into a single time series are not scientifically valid, this paper 
omits scenario studies projecting single data points.  
 
2.4 Energy Sector Data  
Future consumption and production patterns from four energy sectors are examined here. 
The data presented for each energy sector is composed of total amount of coal, oil, natural gas, 
and nuclear energy required and produced by all energy-reliant domestic sectors. Due to the 
direction of China’s economic development, automotive growth will be heavily dependent on 
primary energy sources. Although renewable energies also help shape China’s energy landscape, 
the country’s reliance on these sources accounts for a negligible share of the energy balance. The 
Chinese government intends to increase renewable energy consumption by 17% in 2015 (Die Zeit 
June 9. 2004). In spite of efforts to raise alternative energy consumption in the long term, the 
assigned role of renewable energy in the energy balance will remain comparatively minor. Also, 
considering the rate at which renewable energy is currently implemented into the energy balance, 
17% renewable energy consumption by 2015 is an incredibly optimistic prediction. As a 
consequence, at least for the next two decades, renewable energy availability will not 
significantly affect the extent to and by what means the economy, and therefore mobility, 
develops. Since few scenarios have extensively forecasted renewable energies use in China, few 
consecutive data sets exist for pattern comparison. Most available data over renewable energy 
data exist in the form of single data points, which are not included in this study. The future of 
renewable energy utilization and growth cannot be overlooked, as these energies are means to 
hydrogen production. In terms of appraising possible energy conditions for the next two decades, 
it is important to first examine resources which serve as catalysts to larger conditions such as 
economic change, and for purposes of this paper, automotive development. From this light, 
primary energies such as coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy are key players in the energy 
mix and will dominate China’s energy balance, so it is relevant that the focus on this paper is 
directed toward these four main energy sources.  
Data collected for this energy comparison exclude energy figures for electricity/power 
generation. A few scenarios only focus on energy production and consumption and consider 
power generation separately. Some scenarios include power generation in production and 
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consumption figures while simultaneously presenting separate data for primary energy 
expenditures and power generation. For consistency, specific energy data related to 
electricity/power generation is omitted from this data comparison. Because the power sector is 
nonetheless an energy-related sector, a glance at electricity generation is presented via graphic 
form. Otherwise, data included here cover primary energy production and consumption for each 
energy sector. While many scenarios break down energy consumption and production along 
sector-specific lines, this is not an approach taken by all scenario developers. To effectively 
compare energy data, a common basis through which the data can be examined is required, so 
energy data must be presented in the broadest scale possible. Details related to energy usage by 
domestic sectors such as industry or transportation are nevertheless crucial for understanding the 
future energy balance, so energy expenditure trends by domestic sectors are separately described 
under the scenario review. 
 
2.5 Unit Conversion for Data 
The data compilation and organization process is also essential to data analysis. To 
effectively compare data, all related, statistical collections must share the same unit of 
measurement. Therefore, all data were converted into a single, scientifically acceptable unit. The 
metric system was used in the conversion process due to the system’s prominence in the 
scientific community.4 Data were converted into the common metric measurement for each 
specific sector. Because most scenario studies measure energy in Metric Tonnes of Oil 
Equivalent (Mtoe), converting data into a common unit served only as a small barrier. 
Conversion accuracy was ensured by using online metric conversion systems and then manually 
crosschecked by using the International System of Units conversion equivalents. While most data 
are measured into convertible units, not all data shared this quality. Occasionally data from the 
same sector were measured in different units such as mass or energy. Because energy units are 
not adaptable to mass equivalents, data within the same sector are occasionally separated into two 
sub-sections, due differences in units.5 This divergence in units does not affect data analysis, as 
the data analysis does not compare specific figures against each other. Instead, energy patterns 
were examined and trends from separate units are comparable. All data were converted to three 
significant figures, allowing clear data analysis while eliminating the complications connected to 
numbers exceeding three significant figures. Data were structurally and numerically presented in 
graphic and chart form. All data sharing the same unit and falling into the same sector were 
plotted on one graph as well as organized in the same data chart. Another factor to be considered 
in data compilation concerns data structure. While some organizations forecast future energy 
expenditures by making one numerical estimate for every five year increment, some scenarios 
present a data range for every five year increment. Because a data range can not be plotted on a 
                                                 
4  The following conversions were used in this study: 
1 million short ton: 0.9071847 mt 
1 mtce: 0.6543 mtoe 
1 mtoe: 1.33 GW 
1 cubic feet: 0.02831 cubic meter 
5  Some scenarios calculated consumption and demand for each primary energy in terms of weight/mass such as in 
metric tonnes or short tonnes, while some studies measured data in energy units such as tonnes of oil equivalent. 
In the case the same energy is measured by different sources using incompatible units, separate charts are 
constructed to document possible trends.  
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column graph for comparative uses, the median point for all scenarios using a data range is used 
when inserting data into column charts.  
 
2.6 Data Organization 
In order to look at the trends in China’s future energy expenditures, data were organized 
into column graphs according to specific energy sectors. Data were also separated according to 
production and consumption. Because the graphs are used for comparative purposes, the scale of 
each energy sector, depending on unit of measurement remains the same for production and 
consumption graphs. Since every energy sector is measured in a different unit, no general scale is 
available to measure all energy sectors. Instead, graphs from specific energy sectors share the 
same scale in production and consumption charts. This system allows for comparison between 
data within each energy sector, but prohibits comparison between data from two different energy 
sectors.  
Along with diverse methodological approaches used by different scenario developers, terms 
describing energy consumption and production also varied. While some scenarios described 
energy activities in terms of future “production” and “consumption,” other organizations used 
“supply” and “demand” when discussing the amount of energy resources available for the future.6 
In order to establish vocabulary consistency, China’s energy resources will be described in terms 
of future energy “production” and “demand” rates. Since terms such as “production “ and 
“demand” may contain dissimilar meanings, to avoid data misinterpretation, all studies were 
checked for consistency in definitions. Some scenarios lacked specific description of such general 
terms, but the definitions can be inferred from the scenario contents. With the exception of the 
scenario written by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Center (APEC Energy Demand and Supply 
Outlook 2002), which builds only a “reference case scenario,” all studies construct not only a 
“business as usual” or “reference case scenario” but also build scenarios based on high/low 
economic development or high/low energy prices. Because different economic conditions affect 
energy usage, all possible energy paths are included for comparison.  
One scenario: “China’s Energy: A Forecast to 2015” is a descriptive scenario. No data time 
series data were available in the text. Nonetheless, it remains a relevant source from which to 
draw a picture of China’s future energy activities. This scenario will not be included in this 
paper’s data analysis section, instead, the scenario will also be considered in the section where 
scenario results are summarized and methodology is investigated.  
 
                                                 
6  Asia Pacific Energy Cooperation (APEC) Energy Demand and Supply Outlook uses  “supply” and 
“consumption” in describing energy activities. Natural gas data from Natural Gas in Asia: The Challenges of 
Growth in China, India, Japan, and Korea uses “production,” and “consumption” when describing future natural 
gas expenditures. Authors from the “Future Implications of China’s Energy Technology Choices” use the term 
“production” in its scenarios. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook describes energy 
in terms of “supply” and “demand.” The International Energy Outlook, compiled by the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) uses the terms “production” and “consumption.” The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies uses the terms “fuel use” and “production” in its scenario. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
and its scenario, “Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China and Japan” define energy activities as 
“demand” and consumption.” The World Bank Discussion Paper: “China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Control” explains energy expenditures as “energy use” and “consumption.” 
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3. Data Analysis 
3.1 Introduction to Data Analysis 
Against the background of the scenario review, the qualitative data developed from the 
collected scenarios is presented in four energy sectors: coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy. 
Because the forecasted figures are calculated according to the methodology designed by each 
scenario, the modeling systems from each scenario is first outlined in the scenario review so the 
nature of the qualitative predictions is placed into context. This section is entirely centered on 
qualitative data. By grouping together forecasted data from all scenarios, any patterns, 
similarities, or discrepancies in energy projections can be discerned. Data analysis is divided into 
the above mentioned four energy sources as well as separated along supply and demand 
categories. Contrasts and similarities in projections will be graphically presented as well as 
textually analyzed. Because some sources consider more than one energy path, taking into 
consideration growth or drops in economic development, these sources present different 
scenarios for the same energy sector. In this situation, all “reference case” or “business as usual” 
scenarios will be compared, with high and low economic growth scenarios to be analyzed 
separately for trends.  
The structure used in analyzing data for this paper resembles the foundation built in the 
discussion paper entitled, “Leapfrogging into Hydrogen Technology: China’s 1990-2000 Energy 
Balance” (Zhu, 2003). Because this examination into the future energy balance serves as a link to 
the past energy balance, the means through which the data is explored must be compatible. In this 
way, a connection between past and future energy balances can be paved. In establishing such a 
link, any transformations to the energy landscape can be easily noticed. Because the country was 
already making efforts to redefine its energy balance in the last decade, this examination into the 
future is an appropriate step oncoming decades. An analysis of the future energy balance is also a 
comparison point to the energy balance from the last decade. Any patterns or changes in energy 
utilization from the past into the future can be considered in the link between the two papers. In 
the process of looking at future energy activities, past energy use as documented in the above-
mentioned discussion paper will be considered. 
 
3.2 Overview of Energy Balance 
A general picture of energy consumption is presented in Table 2 in which total primary 
energy consumption is forecasted by various scenario studies. While not all sources offer an 
overall energy consumption forecast, Table 2 presents all scenarios used in this paper making a 
forecast in primary energy consumption. General consumption is measured in percentage points 
against the respective base case used in each scenario study. Because all scenarios are developed 
from different base years (see Section 3: Scenario Review), forecasted growth levels must be 
considered in relation to the base year against which the scenario is built. The following table 
presents energy consumption as forecasted for the business-as-usual case. 
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Energy Consumption Growth by Percentage 
  
World 
Bank DOE  JBIC IEA 2000 APEC IEO 2003 
EPJ 
(Li ZhiDong) 
2000 4.1 6.0 1.5 - 2 3.2  3.8  3.6 
2005 4.1 6.0 1.5 - 2 3.2 2.7 3.8  3.6 
2010 4.1 6.4 1.5 - 2 3.2  2.7 3.8  3.6 
2015 4.1 6.6 1.5 - 2 3.2 2.7 3.8  3.6 
2020 4.1   1.5 - 2 3.2 2.7 3.8  3.6 
                          Table 2 
 
With the exception of DOE consumption figures, forecasted consumption rates from 
available scenario were consistent across the board. While most consumption rates ranged 
between 2 and 4%, DOE estimates energy consumption to grow beyond 6% in the next fifteen 
years. The biggest discrepancy in predictions measured at 5.1%, between DOE and JBIC figures. 
Not considering the DOE estimates, expectations for future consumption from the scenario 
studies remain homogeneous, with most predictions falling in the 3% range.   
Because energy forecasts are made against the framework of a country’s economy, any 
consumption increase in the next two decades must be considered in relation to China’s economic 
growth. Table 3 shows forecasted economic growth from most of the scenario studies since not 
all sources used in this paper made economic forecasts. Changes in China’s development are 
measured in percentage points. The economic landscape represented in Table 3 is built along a 
business-as-usual case in which China’s economic transformation continues undisturbed.  
 
Economic Development 
  
World 
Bank JBIC IEA 2000 JCIE IEO 2003 
EPJ 
(E. Larson) 
EPJ 
(Li ZhiDong) 
2000 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.4 6.2 7.0 7.9 
2005 8.0 7.0 6.0 7.4 6.2 7.0 7.9 
2010 8.0 7.0 6.0 7.4 6.2 5.5 7.9 
2015 6.5 7.0 6.0 7.4 6.2 5.5 7.3 
2020 6.5 7.0 6.0 7.4 6.2 5.5 7.3 
               Table 3 
 
Economic growth, across the board, appears consistent, with all sources, making uniform 
predictions for China’s economic development in the next decade. The greatest disparity in 
economic growth lay between the scenario developed by Eric Larson, et al (Energy Policy 
Journal) and the World Bank Scenario for the year 2010 in which a 2.5% difference separates the 
Larson, et al forecast from the World Bank prediction. Aside from this disparity, forecasts from 
the scenario studies forecast China’s annual economic growth to fall between 6 and 7%.  
 
Electricity Generation 
As previously mentioned in the methodology section, energy use for the power generation 
sector will not be explored in detail. Instead, a brief summary is presented below.  
The link between economy and energy is especially manifested between the relationship 
China’s industries share with the power generation sector. In the past two decades, China 
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averaged an estimated 8% annual growth of installed electricity capacity, but the current 
electricity supply cannot fulfill the demand spurred by residential and industrial usage (Yeoh & 
Rajaraman, 2004). The industrial sector, especially, depends on abundant and consistent 
electricity production, serving as the leading consumer of power. Because the industrial sector 
drives China’s economy, the availability of electric power serves as the “lifeblood of an 
economy.” In 2003, the electrical capacity in China could not meet demand, resulting in 
shortages, forcing abrupt factory shut-downs and leading to unfilled factory orders (People’s 
Daily February 25, 2004). Since the country’s economy rests heavily on industrial output, factory 
closures resulting from power shortages directly affects the country’s economy. Growth in the 
residential sector and city planning also heightens electricity demand as power-heavy sectors 
such as cement, steel, and aluminum escalate production (Los Angeles Times September 4, 
2004). Already, Chinese officials foresee a continued, unfulfilled gap between power supply and 
demand.  
In general, rises in power consumption complements economic growth, but in China, 
electricity consumption rates have surpassed economic growth figures. A combination of 
inefficient energy consumption, especially in the industrial and residential sectors; ineffective 
energy forecasting, and a restructured generation industry affect the supply/demand ratio. In 
anticipation of inevitable power shortages, the Chinese government is making efforts to reduce 
the disparity between supply and demand. According to People’s Daily, new power generators 
with capacity up to 420 KW’s were scheduled to go online by the end of 2004 (February 25, 
2004). In an effort to reduce electricity use during prime hours, electricity prices for the peak 
hours are set higher, compelling factories to shift production to evenings and weekends. 
Electricity prices in general have also been raised 4.4%, in attempt at reducing overall electricity 
use (BusinessWeek July, 2004). Yet, electricity consumption would decrease more quickly if 
energy saving measures in the industrial and residential sector were stringently applied. 
When considering China’s future energy balance, power generation must be included in the 
energy balance. Although electricity supply and demand does not directly affect China’s 
automotive infrastructure, the country’s power supply does play a role in directing the country’s 
economic growth, which in turn influences automotive development. The following table 
presents forecasted electricity generation rates in Terawatt hours. As already pointed out, this 
glance into power generation, albeit brief, does give a general view into how power generation is 
analyzed for the future. Unlike energy consumption rates, forecasted figures for electricity 
generation are not so consistent. The range of predicted generation rates is broad and forecast 
disparities measure around 3000 TWh for 2010 and around 5000 TWh in 2015. Despite the wide 
discrepancies in the forecasts, a general pattern for power generation does emerge from the 
predictions. For the next two decades, electricity generation is predicted to increase annually and 
actual generation figures fall between 2000 and 3000 TWh. 
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Electricity Generation (TWh) 
  
World 
Bank JBIC IEA 2000 JCIE APEC 2002 
EPJ  
(Eric Larson) 
EPJ 
(Li ZhiDong) 
2005  ~1425    ~1350 2332 
2010  ~1584 2408 4700-5000  ~2600 2332 
2015    6900-7400  ~2950 2332 
2020 3850   3691     ~3200 3772 
 Table 4 
 
3.3 Coal 
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Coal Production: High Substitution 
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 Figure 3 
 
Coal production trends do not vary between figures 1 and 2. All sources forecast coal 
production to increase in the next two decades. While the difference between data is negligible in 
figure 1, the level of production growth is slightly more varied in figure 2. All data sources show 
an upward increase in coal production. Although the pattern reflects such an increase, the rate at 
which production occurs appears minimal from all data sources. The discrepancy between coal 
production data is small, ranging from 305 Mt in figure 1 to 139 and 114 Mtoe in figure 2. The 
World Bank Study offers two possibilities for China’s coal production future. Figure 1 describes 
the “baseline” possibility and figure 3 considers the amount of coal produced when the maximum 
amount of alternative energy sources are substituted in place of fossil fuels. Despite the 
possibility of replacing alternative energies with fossil fuels, a reduction in the coal production 
rate under the high substitution scenario remains minimal. This overall pattern, in which coal 
production slowly, but steadily increases into the next decades appears as a continuation of the 
last decade’s production pattern.7 According to international sources, coal production dropped 
between 1990 and 2000. Yet, the production trend from the scenario sources, suggests that it will 
not continue along the last’s decade’s descending pattern. Instead, coal production is forecasted 
to slowly rise in the next two decades. Although most scenario studies point to a reduction of coal 
in the energy balance, production rates, nonetheless, continue to rise. This is especially shown in 
the reference case forecasts, in which all sources exhibit rising production rates. 
                                                 
7  Assumptions are based on the discussion paper by Ying Zhu entitled “Leapfrogging into Hydrogen Technology 
China’s 1990-2000 Energy Balance.” 
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Coal Demand: Low Economic Growth 
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 Figure 8 
 
The trend in all figures suggests China’s future coal consumption to gradually increase. All 
data sources from reference cases reflect the same rising consumption level. The disparity 
between data sources is negligible as all sources from figures 6 and 7 show slow, but increasing 
patterns. Both the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Energy Information 
Administration present energy scenarios based on “high economic growth.” While both sources 
show a growing consumption trend for this economic condition, the two sources differ in relation 
to the reference case scenario. According to JBIC, high economic growth in China implies a 
growing consumption trend with figures falling below the reference case scenario. In other words, 
were China to experience rapid economic development in the next two decades, the country 
would consume less coal than if it maintained its current economic level. According to the data 
from the EIA, high economic growth is coupled with an increase in coal consumption, with 
figures exceeding its base case scenario. However, despite the difference in consumption rates, 
the trend presented by both scenario studies remains similar. Whether consumption figures are 
reduced or increased in a high economic growth context, the consumption trend reflects growth. 
Along with considering high economic insurgence, the EIA also constructed a scenario for low 
economic growth. On the condition that China enters two decades of low economic growth, coal 
consumption would continue to rise annually, but at a slower rate compared to the reference case 
situation. This forecasted growth continues the falling consumption pattern from the last decade. 
The forecast suggests that consumption for the next twenty years mirrors production tendencies, 
in which coal consumption will rise. This increase in consumption is not extreme, as most studies 
predict the amount of coal consumed in the energy balance to fall. 
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3.4 Oil 
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According to figures 9 and 10, oil production until 2015 will rise. Beyond this date, 
forecasts for oil production change. In figure 9, production rates drop from 2015 to 2020, while in 
figure 10, production rates continue increasing. Although data from figure 9 show a decrease in 
production, this drop is minute, but nonetheless strays from the production trend in figure 10. 
Data from the two sources in figure 9 display little variation, but the rate at which production 
rates grow in figure 10 are less consistent. The largest discrepancy between source predications is 
measured at 314 Mtoe for oil production in 2020 between predictions from International Energy 
Agency and data from Larson, Wu, Delaquil, Wenying, and Pengfei in the Energy Policy Journal. 
Despite the different data ranges in figure 10, the trend from all scenarios is consistent; oil 
production will continue to gradually rise. While sources from figure 10 show continual growth 
in oil production, such increases are consistently small. The EIA also projects energy 
developments based on the changing world prices. The EIA bases its reference case on oil prices 
from 2003 and suggests growth in Chinese oil production until 2015. Beyond this point, figure 11 
shows a difference in production trend. The EIA scenario shows no change in trend, as oil 
production rises into 2020. In case the global oil market settles upon oil prices that fall below the 
reference case price, the EIA suggest an increase in oil production up to 2010 with drops in 
production rates in the next decade. Considering the link between forecasted oil production and 
the oil produced between 1990 and 2000, China’s future production patterns adhere to the pattern 
already established in the last decade, in which production will continue to rise until 2015, 
although the rate at which production rises is sluggish. Beyond this point, the future of 2020 
production lacks a homogeneous pattern. Some scenarios forecast oil production to fall, while 
other sources forecast production patterns to continue upward. 
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     Oil Demand: High Growth Case 
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 Figure 15 
 
Unlike projections of oil production, oil consumption levels are projected by all sources to 
increase in the next two decades. Not only do trends in figures 13 and 14 reveal a consistently 
rising consumption pattern. Data dissimilarities between sources are minimal, with the greatest 
difference measuring at 90.4 Mtoe between the EIA and JBIC data for consumption in 2010. 
Figure 15 reflects JBIC’s consumption scenario on a high growth case scenario in which, like the 
baseline case, oil demand continues to intensify. Figures from JBIC’s high economic growth case 
unsurprisingly reflect growth levels exceeding the reference case data. Oil consumption from the 
last decade consistently showed demand increases and forecasted oil demand does not stray from 
this trend. 
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3.5 Natural Gas 
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  Figure 16                                                                                                Figure 17 
 
According to data from figures 16 and 17, natural gas production will incrementally rise in 
the next two decades. Although sources from figure 16 and 17 are measured in different units, the 
trend from figure 16 matches the rising production pattern in figure 17. The numerical difference 
between source data is small in figure 16, with the greatest difference of 14 Bm3. Data 
discrepancies in figure 17 are only slighter larger, as APEC forecasts for production rates are 
consistently higher than IEA predictions, with the largest dissimilarity measured at 26.5 Mtoe. 
Despite variations in data, all sources predict an increase in natural gas production. Production 
rates will not rise very quickly, but will develop gradually between 10 and 30 Bm3 or 15 and 35 
Mtoe every five years. Natural gas production increased on an annual basis in the last decade, 
fulfilling the Chinese government’s ambitions to intensify reliance on the country’s gas resources. 
All sources from this paper project the share of natural gas in the production/supply balance to 
expand and the uninterrupted growth in production forecasted for the next twenty years not only 
follows the pre-existing production trend from 1990-2000, but also follows along administrative 
plans from the Chinese government to enhance the natural gas supply.  
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Natural gas consumption is slated to increase by 2020. Figures 18 and 19 reflect reference 
case scenarios with trends revealing consumption growth from all sources. Unit measurements 
vary between figures 18 and 19, but consumption patterns do not. Unlike natural gas production, 
where forecasted data showed little divergence, the rift between sources as to the amount of 
natural gas to be consumed in each of the five-year increments is more spread out. Because the 
consumption trends for all sources are the same, such data discrepancies do not impact the trend 
analysis.  Along with the base scenario options, the EIA and David Fridley, author of “Natural 
Gas in China” have also projected consumption to be influenced by economic change.  Both 
Fridley and the EIA project increasing natural gas use in both a high and low economic scenario. 
The difference between the two situations lies in the rate at which the energy is consumed. Were 
China to experience a drop in economic development, the country would continue to increase its 
use of natural gas, but the consumption rate would fall below reference case projections. In the 
context of accelerated economic growth, China would experience the same rising consumption 
trend, but is projected to use more gas than in the base scenario. China has shown steady natural 
gas consumption rates since the beginning of the last decade, in which consumption levels, like 
production capacity, grew. The forecasted natural gas pattern does not abandon the already 
established consumption pattern. Within the next two decades, the scenario studies project a 
continuance of the consumption trend from 1990-2000, in which natural gas follows an upward 
trend. Because the Chinese government pushes for a more significant natural gas presence in the 
energy balance, the forecasted consumption rates suitably follow not only government plans, but 
also the momentum set by consumption patterns from the last decade.  
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While forecasts focusing on nuclear energy are not common and many sources do not 
predict nuclear energy expenditures along a consistent time frame, the existing data in figure 22 
suggests production to grow over the next two decades. This trend is reflected by all figure 22 
sources. The World Bank provides an alternative scenario, one which considers nuclear 
production when the maximum amount of alternative energy sources is substituted in place of 
fossil fuels. Because the World Bank only offers data for 2020, no trend is present for this 
situation. What can be seen is that if China shifts emphasis towards alternative energies, nuclear 
production would increase over twice the amount produced in a “baseline” scenario. Since 1993, 
nuclear production capacity has enlarged from new plant construction. Nuclear production levels 
are predicted to increase by all available scenario studies and this pattern suitably fits into the 
production trend from the last decade. Because more plants are scheduled to go online in the next 
decade, the unbroken growth pattern projected by scenario studies for nuclear production is also 
compatible with government plans.  
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Figure 24 presents the reference case pattern for nuclear consumption, showing it to 
constantly grow over the two decade period. While one large data discrepancy exists between the 
two sources of 43,000 billion watts (GW), in general both reflect the same growth pattern. Along 
with a reference case scenario, the EIA has also constructed scenarios based on economic growth 
that either exceeds or falls short of the reference case economic situation. In both cases, nuclear 
consumption will increase. Figure 25, revealing data for high economic growth, suggests nuclear 
consumption levels to surpass present consumption rates in the reference case scenario. While 
figure 26 also illustrates growing consumption trend, the figures fall below those set in the 
reference case. Regardless of China’s economic condition, all three figures illustrate a consistent 
increase in nuclear consumption for the next two decades. Much like the rising trend in nuclear 
production from the last decade, demand for nuclear energy has constantly grown since 1993. 
This unbroken, upward trend is projected to continue into the next decade as nuclear consumption 
is predicted to increase in all economic conditions.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has outlined the energy setting upon which China’s advancing automobile 
market may expand. Due to the inevitable link between energy, economy, and automobile 
development, the country’s energy balance partially defines the direction of economic growth and 
automotive progress. According to the scenario studies used here, the energy balance in the next 
twenty years reveals a discrepancy between production and consumption. The growing private-
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car movement may confront high consumption rates and insufficient supplies. The industrial 
machine fueling China’s exploding economy, rising residential power requirements, and 
inefficient energy-based technology aggravate energy consumption levels. China’s automotive 
development face is consistently expanding. A continued, but decreasing dependence on coal, 
potential disparity between natural gas supply and demand, and a forecasted rise in nuclear plants 
exists. 
This paper only considers the energy balance in the context of present and future situations. 
Past energy activities are also relevant when examining the future energy balance, as the energy 
mix from the last decades can reveal patterns that may follow in the future. For this purpose, a 
complete picture of the energy balance including past, present, and future expenditures must be 
laid. Because data from China’s energy expenditure between 1990 and 2000 had already been 
collected in the discussion paper entitled “Leapfrogging into Hydrogen Technology, China’s 
1990 – 2000 Energy Balance,” a general picture of the energy landscape can be erected by 
combining data accumulated therein with forecasted data assembled in this paper. While the 
means through which this picture is built are not entirely scientific, its necessity outweighs the 
scientific weakness. A visual image, revealing the patterns from past, present, and future energy 
expenditures is the most optimal method for understanding the energy landscape. These graphs 
serve as one means to link data collected from the first energy discussion paper with energy 
figures for the future. In light of slightly uncertain methodology, the following charts must be 
seen as a loose picture, revealing possible progress in China’s past, current, and future energy 
balance. 
Four graphs chart energy development from 1990 to 2020. These figures serve to bridge the 
two discussion papers. Because data for this paper are documented in five-year increments, for 
reasons of consistency, these charts contain data for every fifth year, starting in 1990 and ending 
with 2020. Each graph shows consumption and production levels from one of four energy sources 
(coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy). Because differences among data for the same year 
exist and because China’s consumption and production levels may respectively rise or fall, each 
chart presents possible high and low level boundaries. Taking the highest and lowest figure from 
each five-year increment, a high and low-level case is produced. In assuming scientific standards, 
such graphs require a single consistent data source, but sources used in the first energy study are 
different from those documented in this paper. As a result, each data point is inevitably derived 
from different data sources. Also, the highest or lowest production and consumption figure from 
each sector, for every five year increment, does not necessarily come from the same data source, 
creating graph lines built from many sources. This problem is especially recognized as 
scientifically problematic, since the means through which sources configure and derive data are 
different. The dissimilarities in methodologies in the various sources push these charts outside 
scientific guidelines. Nonetheless, a complete look at China’s entire energy landscape, including 
possible future activities, balances the diluted scientific methodology used constructing such 
charts. Another factor which must also be pointed out is related to units of measurements. As 
described in the methodology section of both papers, some sources used incompatible units of 
measurement. Therefore, two separate charts for the same energy source were erected. Because 
only one unit of measurement can be used for these graphs, the data chosen for each point were 
derived from the unit of measurement most scientifically connected to each energy source.8 The 
                                                 
8   For coal, the most common unit is million metric tonnes, so only data presented with this unit were considered. 
For oil, the most scientific unit of measurement was also milllion metric tonnes.  Natural gas is primarily 
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following charts must be considered with some reserve, yet, from examining the patterns found in 
both papers, the overall picture for each source is not unrealistic and effectively fits along the 
general trends already discussed in both papers.  
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documented in the form of billion  metric meters. Nuclear energy data are calculated in terms of billion gigawatt 
hours. This means, that sources use measuring data in million metric tonnes of oil equivalent, the most common 
alternative unit of measurement.  
9  Because numbers for each data point are derived from different sources, all sources used in constructing figures 
28 – figure 30 are listed. Data for the coal consumption and production chart are taken from: International 
Energy Outlook 2003; Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2002;: International Energy 
Annual 2000 and 2001; United Nations 1994, 1998, and 1999 Energy Statistics Yearbook; Rethinking Energy 
Security in East Asia;  Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries; World Bank Discussion 
Paper: China Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control; Future Implications of China’s Energy 
Technology Choices 
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10   Data for oil consumption and production are taken from; Energy Statistics of Non-OECD Countries; 
International Energy Annual 2000 and 2001; Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries; 
Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia; International Energy Outlook 2003; A Econometric Study on China’s 
Economy, Energy, and Environment to the Year 2030; Asia Pacific Energy Cooperation Energy Database; China 
Energy Databook Version 5.0; BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2002; International Energy Outlook 
2003 
11  Data for figure 29, which outlines natural gas consumption and production uses the following sources: 
International Energy Outlook 2003; Natural Gas in Asia; China Energy Databook Version 5.0; An Econometric 
Study on  China’s Economy, Energy, and Environment to the Year 2030; Future Implications of China’s Energy-
Technology Choices; Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2002; Rethinking Energy 
Security in Ease Asia; China Energy Databook Version 5.0; Natural Gas in Asia; World Energy Outlook 2000; 
APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002 
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As a whole, the complete time charts delineating three time periods suitably represent 
China’s energy landscape into the next two decades. China and its developing automotive sector 
have and will face an abundant coal supply. Yet, according to figure 27, China’s large coal 
reserves will not quite meet supply demand in both the high and low level case (although low 
demand is met by high consumption). This discrepancy between consumption and production is 
not always present when single scenario studies are examined, in which coal consumption is 
effectively met by production rates. From a trend perspective, energy trends, consumption and 
production lines in figure 27 follow along the same, upward growth with all four lines closely 
clustering together. In comparison to the large discrepancy between production and consumption 
rates of oil, this minor difference in figure 27 can be read in relation to slightly faulty graph 
building methodology. Figure 28 creates a picture in which both supply and demand increase, 
with supply rates growing at a rate that is incompatible with demand. This is the general picture 
consistently presented by all data sources for the past, present, and future. China is building its 
automotive infrastructure against a diminishing oil supply. In combining an automotive society 
with insufficient oil supplies, the country confronts the persistent need for foreign oil support. 
This case not only affects worldwide oil supplies, but also distresses domestic and international 
energy security. Considering the rising car demands, China cannot domestically sustain its 
mobilization. Natural gas supply, in figure 29, also falls short of demand, a trend not uncommon 
among data sources. Although consumption and production levels do not sit on an even keel, 
between 1990 and 2020, both consumption and production trends show upward growth. The 
natural gas landscape appropriately fits along government intentions to expand both supply and 
use. The Chinese government has planned natural gas demand to be fulfilled by domestic 
                                                 
12  Energy Statistics of Non-OECD Countries; APEC Energy Handbook; International Energy Annual 2000 and 
2001; United  Nations 1993, 1994, 1999 Energy Statistical Yearbook; Key Indicators of Developing Asian and 
Pacific Countries; BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2002; China Energy Databook Version 5.0; 
APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002; World Energy Outlook 2002; China: Issues and Options in 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control; International Energy Outlook 2003; An Econometric Study on China’s 
Economy, Energy, and Environment to the Year 2030 
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supplies. According to the scenario studies used in this paper, from an infrastructure and 
resources perspective, this expectation cannot be feasibly met, as shown in figure 29. Of the four 
energy graphs, comparisons between nuclear consumption and production are most problematic. 
Ultimately, nuclear consumption and production will rise in 2020. Growth rates from figure 30 
are not only sporadic, but also discordant. Neither high nor low level cases for production and 
consumption were correspondent, with figures rising and falling inconsistently in the five year 
increments. Methodology and data variability partially cause incongruent supply and demand 
trends, and the relationship between past and future supply and production, is one of constant 
growth.  
Glancing at figures 27 to 30, as well as examining the data collections from this and the last 
energy study, China faces energy gaps on many fronts, especially in the sector most relevant to a 
traditional mobilization process. The gap between supply and demand in the oil sector grows 
wider each year and only foreign oil supplies can close it. Historically and recently, China 
satisfies energy demand through coal consumption cannot easily be reduced. Coal use has 
become and will continue to be an energy habit. Although reductions in coal have made room for 
natural gas and nuclear energy in the country’s overall energy mix, coal will continue to play a 
dominant, if slowly diminishing role in the energy balance. Natural gas serves as a suitable 
alternative to coal and oil use, but production capacity cannot fill consumption rates. Dependence 
on nuclear energy is rising. As plants are annually constructed, domestic production will meet 
internal demand.  
Having relied on coal and oil for many decades, China cannot immediately restructure its 
consumption patterns. These energy dependencies are revealed in the forecasted energy balance, 
in which coal and oil remain primary sources in the energy make-up. Were the country to 
undergo a traditional motorization process, China  could not avoid exacerbating its old energy-
utilization habits. Only by building an automotive infrastructure that makes use of an alternative 
fuel can China rewrite the energy balance. From this perspective, adopting leapfrogging 
technology in the form of a hydrogen-based automotive infrastructure can be one option. Energy 
expenditures from the last decade already reflect slow, but well-intentioned efforts to exploit 
alternative resources.  But coal will continue to play a large role in China’s energy expenditures, 
so the country must take it into account when considering hydrogen technology.  China must find 
a way to exploit coal and renewable energies when erecting a hydrogen-based automobile 
society.  Since hydrogen can be produced from renewable and nonrenewable energies, all of 
China’s resources, especially its vast collection of renewable energies and coal surplus, serve as 
an appropriate backdrop against which to adopt hydrogen technology.  China’s developing 
natural gas and nuclear energy sectors ensure potential leapfrogging possibilities.  While China 
uses minimal amounts of renewable energy, as suggested by the lack of appropriate energy data, 
the country is nonetheless endowed with valuable resources.  And, enough infrastructure exists in 
biomass, solar, geothermal, hydro, and wind sectors to extend technology and resource 
development. 
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5. Measurement Units 
 
Bbl Barrel 
Gm3 One Billion Cubic Meters 
GWh One Billion Watt Hours 
MMbbl/d Million Barrels per Day 
Mt Million Metric Tonnes 
Mtce Million Tonnes of Coal Equivalent 
Mtoe Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent 
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6. Appendix 
 
Scenario Review 
 
The scenario/forecast studies used in the data analysis and included in the methodology 
summaries are listed in Table 1.  
 
Scenario/Forcast     Author           Published Data Period 
              
World Bankc Discussion Paper  Center for Strategic and International Studies 1996 1990-2020 
China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas  Joint Report: The National Environment Protection Agency of China,     
Emissions Control   The State Planning Commission of China, UN Development Program,     
     and the World Bank        
              
U.S. Department of Energy  Los Alamos National Laboratory and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 1996 1995-2015 
China's Energy: A Forecast to 2015           
              
Japan Bank for International Cooperation Research Institute for Development and Finance   2000 1990-2020 
Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 China and Japan          
           2000 1990-2020 
World Energy Outlook 2000  International Energy Agency       
              
Japan Center for International Exchange Gao Shixian (Edited by Paul B. Stares)    2000 1990-2015 
Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia           
Chapeter on China            
              
APEC Energy Demand and Supply  Asian Pacific Energy Research Center    2002 1999-2020 
Outlook 2002: China            
              
Natural Gas in Asia: Natural Gas in China David Fridley (Edited by Ian Wybrew-Bond and Jonathan Stern  2002 2000-2020 
              
International Energy Outlook 2003  Energy Information Administration    2003 1990-2025 
              
Energy Policy Journal:   Eric Larson, Wu Zongxin, Pat DeLaquil, Chen Wenying, and Gao Penfei 2003 1995-2050 
Future Implications of China's            
Energy-Technology Choices           
              
 Energy Policy Journal:                   
An Econometric Study of China’s Economy,  Li ZhiDong      2003  1999-2030 
 Energy, and Environment to 2030                       
                        
 
Table 1 
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7. Detailed Scenario Descriptions 
 
World Bank Paper: China Issues & Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control 
 
Methodology 
This study examines the relationship between economic development and greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions in China from 2000-2020. This model is macroeconomic model calculating future 
GHG emission consequences. While this study does not directly focus on China’s energy 
expenditures, forecasted energy consumption nonetheless serves as a coefficient in the modeling 
system. The GHG model is composed of four sub-models: an econometric macroeconomic 
model, an 18 sector input-output model, energy consumption figures, and emission coefficients. 
The energy coefficient model determines coal, petroleum, natural gas, and electricity use from 18 
energy-consuming sectors. Energy consumption trends are estimated in relation to the energy 
required for producing major commodities within these sectors. China’s economic growth, new 
plant and equipment development relative to existing structures, rate of adopting energy-saving 
technologies, and increases in product diversity and product quality improvement affect energy 
coefficients in this model. Two scenarios for GHG emissions are assembled. A baseline scenario 
supposes Chinese economic patterns to continue along trends in the 1980’s and early 1990’s.13 
The baseline scenario also assumes energy efficiency improvements will continue. Two 
economic development scenarios were built under the baseline scenarios: a high-growth scenario 
assuming few political and social disruptions, high saving rate maintenance, and economic 
reform continuation; and a slower-growth case in which the economy grows at a slower rate 
(1.5%) than the figure calculated for high-growth scenario. For reference purposes, a business-as-
usual energy demand scenario was prepared as another means through which to consider GHG 
emissions. A high-efficiency energy demand scenario is introduced under the baseline scenario 
umbrella. This is done to determine benefits of increasing energy-efficient technology levels. 
Here, consumption parameters are adjusted, especially for the industrial sector, so energy use 
resembles advanced international rates. Along with the baseline scenario, the study also produced 
a high-substitution scenario. This case reflects the maximum possible alternative energy sources 
utilized in 2020 following 1990 development trends. 
 
Results 
According to this World Bank study, energy consumption in the baseline case reaches 3,300 
million tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce). Economic growth, as measured in GDP, is predicted at 
8.0% between 1990 and 2020. Because two economic scenarios are also constructed within the 
baseline scenario, GDP increase differs according to the speed at which the economy is assumed 
to grow. In the high-growth case, China’s economy will grow at 8.0% from 2000 - 2010 and 
6.5% from 2010 - 2020.  When GDP is forecasted against a slow-growth case, average annual 
GDP is projected to increase by 6.5% from 2000 to 2010 and 5.0% from 2010 to 2020. Due to 
potential changes in the industrial production mix and sources of value added in industry, energy 
intensity should also fall.14 A fall in energy intensity of 0.5% is projected for the next two 
decades. Along economic growth and energy intensity predictions, this study also provides 
                                                 
13  The base year that sets the Baseline scenario is not specified.  
14  Energy intensity is the relationship between energy consumption and economic growth. It is calculated as the 
ratio of energy consumed over GDP growth. 
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forecasts over energy use. In the high growth GDP case, energy demand is predicted to grow at 
4.1% per annum. The study’s baseline case forecasts coal demand to tripple between 1991 and 
2020. Consumption rates are set to increase by 3.7% p.a. Natural gas is predicted to grow 7% per 
annum while annual development in oil consumption is expected at 4.7% per year. Expansion in 
nuclear power production is also forecasted in this study. Because electricity is normally 
generated by coal, increases in nuclear consumption alleviate the reliance on coal. Coal 
consumption is expected to fall from 76% in 1990 to 67% in 2020. While the amount of coal 
consumed in China’s overall energy mix is diminishing, this study forecasts coal for power 
generation to increase from 24% in 1990 to 42% in 2020. Industrial coal demand will also rise to 
1,400 million tonnes (Mt) in 2020. Primary, commercial energy demand in the high-efficiency 
energy scenario reaches 2,840 Mtce, suggesting an energy savings of 460 Mtce when compared 
to baseline energy consumption. Although the study does not state specific figures, energy 
consumption by the transport sector is predicted “to be huge in absolute terms and relative to 
energy use worldwide.” In the baseline scenario, fossil fuels provide 91% of the energy supply 
and 78% of power generation. Under the high substitution scenario, this percentage falls to 81% 
for total primary energy consumption and 61% for electricity production.  
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U.S. Department of Energy (DOE): China’s Energy. A Forecast to 2015 
 
Methodology 
This report considers China’s future energy production and consumption trends to 2015 in 
relation to U.S. energy security. China’s energy consumption is projected by sector (industrial, 
transportation, residential building, and agriculture) and fuel type. For this forecast, commercial 
and residential sectors are combined under the residential “building” sector. An energy intensity 
model is used for projecting energy demand through which historical energy intensity and 
sectoral GDP trends are analyzed. The study developed a “business as usual” (BAU) and “energy 
efficient” (EE) scenario from the energy intensity model. The study assumes validity in past 
consumption patterns and constructs the BAU scenario along current development patterns. The 
study does not specify a base year used for trend analysis, but the period 1995-2015 is examined 
in detail with trend charts beginning in 1980. Pre-existing trends were considered in relation to 
potentially new social and economic policies that could influence economic growth and energy 
consumption; energy advancement and trends from comparable countries undergoing similar 
development processes; and technology utilization tendencies and their implications for energy 
consumption. The energy efficient scenario is based on energy intensity reduction in major 
consumption sectors through strengthening energy efficient technologies. When examining fuel 
consumption discrepancies, this study assumes reduction in energy demand between the BAU 
and EE scenario results only in coal consumption. Because energy production is also explored, 
two scenarios: the “Standard Supply Scenario” which expects minimum production capacity and 
the “Maximum Supply Scenario” based on larger production capabilities were developed. 
According to this report, actual production tendencies will fall between the two scenarios. The 
Standard Supply Scenario assumes average growth rate to follow 1980 growth patterns, while the 
Maximum Supply Scenario assumes high energy production to not only emerge, but also to be 
maintained in 2015.  
 
Results 
From 1995 to 2015, the DOE report forecasts final energy demand to average 6.5% on an annual 
basis. Industry sector forecasts under the BAU scenario point to industry as the largest energy 
consumer with the final energy demand falling to 60% in 2015. Industrial energy intensity is also 
predicted to decrease as technology efficiency improves and fewer energy intensive products are 
manufactured. Industrial final energy requirements, largely fulfilled by the coal supply, are 
forecasted to reach 1,240 Mtoe in 2015. Residential energy consumption, primarily dependent on 
coal and biomass, will increase the fastest, growing from 2.7% of China’s entire energy demand 
to 7.3% final energy use. Energy use in this sector is forecasted to reach 357 Mtoe in 2015. Due 
to expanding road passenger traffic in the transportation sector, sectoral energy consumption is 
set to grow at 5.2% p.a. Because road usage has been consistently increasing, energy intensity in 
the transportation sector will decrease 2% p.a. until 2005 and then diminish by 1% until 2015. 
Increases in primary energy demand from the energy efficient scenario is approximately 1 
percentage point lower, growing on average 5.7% per annum. Energy intensity, even under the 
EE scenario is not predicted to decrease drastically, as energy intensity under the BAU case is 
already very optimistic. The industrial sector, under the EE case requires 1150 Mtoe of energy in 
2015 with the residential building sector to reach 324 Mtoe in the same year. Because diesel and 
electric locomotives are predicted to replace steam locomotives in the transportation sector, the 
energy sector under the EE scenario will consume 186.9 Mtoe and decrease in energy intensity by 
3% p.a. Within the energy consumption balance, agriculture uses only 5% of total final energy, 
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thereby ranking low in the energy-use sector. Due to the labor intensive, low technology farming 
strategy, coal dominates this sector’s energy demand. Coal production has grown 4.65% on 
average and the Standard Supply scenario projects this growth rate to continue to 2015, whereas 
the Maximum Supply scenario predicts a 7.5% coal supply increase. According to the Standard 
Supply figures, oil production rates are set at 2.93% per year, while the Maximum Supply 
scenario production rates are slightly higher at 5%. Despite some growth in oil production rates, 
this report acknowledges China’s rapidly rising import level. DOE forecasts China to import 
between 1.2 and 2.1 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) in 2005 with figures reaching 5.8 to 8.6 
MMbbl/d in 2015. Natural gas production figures resemble oil production growth for both 
scenario cases. 8.7 GW of generated nuclear power, as a result of technology improvements to 
existing plants and new plant developments, is forecasted for 2010.   
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Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China 
and Japan 
 
Methodology 
This JBIC study centers on building a database from which an E3 (energy environment economy) 
model is constructed from an existing framework. In this context, a sectoral model projecting 
China’s energy balance for the next decade is also erected. What is ultimately produced is an 
energy balance forecast using the newly designed model, the Energy Environment Economy 
Model for the Globe (E3MG). Energy forecasts are based on a baseline simulation of energy 
demand for China to 2010. Along with baseline energy forecasts, the study also considers the 
energy expenditure patterns from a high economic growth case. The Chinese economy in the 
E3MG model is forecasted by “establishing dynamic behavior from the time-series data over the 
post reform period.” This econometric model contains a data problem since suitable Chinese data 
before 1980 is difficult to obtain. As a consequence, the time series used for the energy and 
economic growth projections covers the period between 1984 and 1995. Econometric models also 
assuming institutional structures are fixed over the data period. In China’s case, this assumption 
is unrealistic, so in the E3MG model, calibration is used to ensure the model has access to the 
most current data. Data for the model was arranged in four stages, in which a databank is 
constructed and organized with a computer program created to fill gaps in any time series. 
Macroeconomic data is placed into the databank for consistency and such data is collected from 
unstated, but recognized international sources. The JBIC estimates a set of energy equations for 
China, covering total energy demand by 17 fuel users from industrial and household sectors. The 
model takes a two-tier approach to energy demand. At the top level, aggregate demand for all 
energy types is presented while the bottom level is based on fuel share equations for primary 
energy estimated for the 17 fuel users. Population growth, output by 32 industries, GDP growth, 
industry investment, and energy prices, in connection with energy demand equations were 
combined to project energy demand for the next decade. This model uses energy consumption 
data from the China Statistical Yearbook and China Energy Statistics, while numbers for national 
accounting are drawn from the “Annual Report on National Accounts.” Because the model uses 
domestic data, data compatibility and energy consumption definitions problems arise. Not all 
figures from each source are directly comparable to the other, while certain fuels are not covered 
in the data sources.  
 
Results  
Assumptions for economic growth are made at the level of 32 industries and according to the 
business as usual outlook, GDP is expected to grow annually by 7%. Overall energy demand is 
expected to increase yearly by 1.5 to 2%. A shift in industry towards less energy-intensive 
activities and priority placed on energy efficiency by some sectors is slated to ease energy 
consumption. Such a change is represented in a forecasted 5% annual fall in energy intensity by 
2010. A reduction in population growth (increasing yearly by 1.5%) is also expected to influence 
energy consumption. The JBIC predicts growth in 17 dominant, energy-based industries, of 
which the electricity sector is considered to expand the fastest. For the purposes of this study, 
only transport growth statistics are recorded. According to this report, rail and road transport are 
forecasted to grow at 6.6% every year, with air transport measuring an annual increase of 8.0%. 
The JBIC study predicts investment in the transport industry, along with transport growth, to also 
swell. For road and rail transport, investment increases annually by 9.1%. Energy demand is 
expected to intensify in the next decade, so this study forecasts energy prices to grow yearly by 
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5%. In 1990, 7% of China’s total energy demand was satisfied by coal use, but coal consumption 
figures fell drastically toward the end of that decade. From 2000 to 2010, growth in coal demand 
is expected to remain flat and reliance on this energy in China’s overall energy balance is 
forecasted to fall below 50%. Oil consumption is expected to grow between 4 and 4.5%. 
According to this study, the rate of oil consumption is consistent with consumption figures over 
the last ten years. Oil is predicted to cover 27% of the energy balance by 2010. This energy 
simulation projects natural gas demand to increase annually by 3.5 to 4%. The JBIC predicts the 
service sector to harbor the fastest growing energy demand. Such an increase is coupled with a 
high-energy intensity level for this sector in the next decade. Along with the service sector, 
energy demand from the transport sector is forecasted to rise annually by 2.5 to 3.5%. Predictions 
over oil demand in the transport sector range between 3 to 4%. Along with baseline forecasts, the 
energy simulations also consider China to experience high growth. In this case, GDP is expected 
to escalate by 9.3% per annum with energy demand to also increase at 2.5%.  
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International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2000  
 
Methodology 
The IEA uses a world energy model (WEM) for long term energy projections. WEM is a 
mathematical model composed of four sub-models: final demand, power generation and other 
transformation, fossil fuel supply and emission trading. The model calls for exogenous 
assumptions in GDP, population, international fossil fuel prices, and technological development. 
Exogenous assumptions, combined with outputs from three regional modules (final energy 
demand, power generation, and fossil fuel supply) are used to project country-based energy 
balances. The IEA’s Energy Statistics Division provides the historical, economic and energy data 
needed for the WEM. Module equation boundaries are determined econometrically using time 
series data from 1971-1997. Adjustments to equation parameters are sometimes made by 
econometric and calibration techniques when expected structural, policy, or technological 
changes arise. Because some transition economies lack reliable data for the entire time series, 
cross-country analysis or expert judgments are substituted for an econometric estimation. Three 
regional modules used in the WEM for energy balance projections are also broken down into sub-
sectors. The standard module for total final energy demand models nine sectors (industry: iron & 
steel; chemicals; other industries; transport: road, aviation; other transport; residential; 
commercial & services; agriculture) with final energy demand defined as the sum of energy 
consumption from all sectors. The sectors in this equation and final energy demand are 
considered in terms of end-user prices, economic growth, population adjustments, and potential 
structural/technological adjustments. The IEA also points out that some non-OECD countries, 
due to a lack of necessary information, must be modeled along a less-detailed energy demand 
equation, but no further details are offered as to which countries required a modified equation 
module. The power generation module calculates necessary new generating capacity, intended 
plant development, electricity generation by plant, fuel consumption for electricity demand, and 
electricity generation costs. The World Outlook calculates peak load by relating electricity 
demand with assumed load curve. This figure is then combined with a minimum reserve plant 
margin and compared with existing plant capacity to determine new generating capacity. Choice 
of new generating capacity is also made on the basis of levelized cost, which examines capital 
and operating and fuels costs for the life of a plant. Eleven different plant technologies are taken 
into account. Nuclear and renewable electricity plant capacity forecasts are generated through 
exogenous assumptions with impacts from international fossil fuel prices. The regional fossil fuel 
supply is forecasted through an oil, gas, and coal module. The oil module calculates oil 
production levels for each region with production divided into non-OPEC, OPEC, and 
unconventional oil production. A short-term approach investigates production profiles according 
to field-by-field analysis. A long-term analysis places emphasis on determining production rates 
according to ultimate recoverable resources and a depletion rate estimated from historical data. 
The natural gas module is also constructed along a resources approach. Unlike the oil module, 
four regional markets: America, Europe, Africa, and Asia are examined whereas the oil supply is 
factored on a single international market. Net importers and net exporters are modeled. When gas 
production from importing countries is measured, the remaining regional demand is transferred to 
exporting countries. Along with oil and gas models, coal supply is also separately analyzed in the 
fossil fuel supply module. The WEM reasons that sufficient coal reserves exist to fulfill the 
international demand. Coal reserves, from an IEA perspective, are also more evenly distributed 
worldwide. So, no coal model has been constructed under the WEM, rather, coal prospects are 
separately considered for each region.  
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Results 
Economic growth, measured according to GDP is projected to increase annually by 6% to 2010. 
This study forecasts, on average, a 5% GDP growth for the entire outlook period, which ends in 
2020. The Chinese population is estimated to reach 1.4 billion by 2020. The IEA projects the 
population to increase at 0.7% per annum. Total primary energy supply is projected to grow by 
3.4% p.a., reaching 1940 Mtoe in 2020. According to this outlook, China has the world’s largest 
per annum incremental energy demand growth. Total primary energy consumption may double 
by 2020. Energy intensity is expected to slowly decline, averaging an annual 1.8% drop. Coal 
will remain the largest energy producer in 2020. Coal demand, nonetheless, is expected to 
diminish.  Much of this demand stems from the power generation sector. In 2020 coal will 
account for 62% of the energy balance (as compared to 72% in 1997). Demand for oil is 
forecasted to rise to 28%. Oil consumption is affected by growth in the transport sector, which 
pushes up the annual growth in oil demand to 4.4%. While natural gas demand will increase by 
7.5% p.a., it only covers 6% of the 2020 energy balance. Nuclear energy will show strong 
growth, measuring around 10.5% p.a. for the next two decades. Despite the increase in nuclear 
consumption, it only represents 2% of the energy balance. Coal demand is projected to grow 
2.6% a year, but demand will nonetheless measure 1192 Mtoe by 2020. The dominance of coal in 
the energy balance is expected to plummet from 54% in 1997 to 35% in 2020. Oil in the energy 
balance, in contrast, will rise to 36% of the final energy consumption. Industry holds the ranking 
having the fastest growth in energy demand. The transport sector will consume 17% of China’s 
energy in comparison to its 13% in 1997. Oil consumption in the transport sector is spurred by 
rising mobility, with road transport fuel demand serving as a large impact in oil demand from a 
transport perspective. Regardless of the rising oil demand, oil production is projected to fall in the 
medium term. Such an imbalance between supply and demand implies imports of 5 million 
barrels per day (Mbbll/d) by the middle of the import period. Expected production, in the long 
term, should decline 2.6 Mbbl/d, with demand to rise by 11 Mbbl/d, resulting in exports 
exceeding 8MMbbl/d by 2020. Oil import increases from 22% to 76% in 2020.  
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Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE): Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia 
 
Results 
Because this outlook does not clarify methodology, only results from the energy projections from 
1995-2015 are presented. In forecasting energy developments, 1995 serves as the base year. All 
projections are based on author expertise and the Chinese Statistical Yearbook. According to this 
outlook, China’s economy is set to grow at an annual rate of 7.4% until 2015. Energy demand 
from secondary industry is expected to decrease from 73.5% in 1995 to 65% in 2015, while 
tertiary industry will use more energy from 10.2% in 1995 to 17.0% in 2015.  While coal takes up 
a smaller chunk in China’s future energy balance, it will nonetheless retain the dominant position. 
Coal consumption is expected to fall from 77.9% in 1995 to 60.8-63.3% in 2015. Natural gas is 
predicted to possess 9.8 to 12.1% of the energy balance, a large development as compared to its 
1.9% share in 1995. Such projections assume investments in necessary energy infrastructure to 
proceed as planned. In case such plans are not carried out, coal assumes a larger energy balance 
portion, measured at 65% by 2015. A rise in energy production is also forecasted, but production 
figures for coal and oil are projected to fall, while the natural gas supply is expected to rise, 
absorbing roughly 7% of the 2015 energy balance, as compared to 1.9% in 1995. This study 
forecasts China’s future oil demand to push the country into a third place oil importing ranking, 
falling behind the United States and Japan for using external oil supplies. Net oil imports of 90 -
100 Mt and 125 – 145 Mt are forecasted for 2010 and 2015, respectively. Such figures suggest 
imports will consist of approximately 32.7-34.6% of the oil supply in 2010 and 38.5-40.9% in 
2015. Imported natural gas is also expected to make up a large portion of the supply, forecasted at 
22.7-24.4% in 2010. This study relies on figures from China’s Electric Power Department in 
forecasting nuclear power developments. Nuclear power supply is expected to reach 15 – 20 GW 
in 2010. Projections for nuclear capacity, when larger plants become operational, range between 
30 to 35 GW.   
 47
Asia Pacific Energy Cooperation (APEC) Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002 
 
Methodology 
The APEC outlook covers the future energy activities of all 21 member countries, including 
China, from 1999 to 2020. Chinese energy expenditures are not only considered as a single unit, 
but China’s energy patterns are also compared and examined in relation to the APEC region. Due 
to the study’s dimensions, it is not necessary to explore China’s energy activities in the context of 
other APEC countries, so this scenario description focuses only on forecasted energy data on 
China. This energy outlook developed a “reference” or “business as usual” scenario with 1999 
serving as the base year against which the scenario is built. Energy supply and demand is 
separated according to energy types. When possible (depending on data quality and quantity), 
econometrics served as the methodological approach for demand side analysis, using a time series 
from 1970 or 1980. What is not specified is whether the outlook applied a 1970 or 1980 times 
series in developing the Chinese energy forecasts. Because the energy landscape transforms 
quickly in one decade, the start period on a time series heavily influences the forecast outcomes. 
From a methodological perspective, the ambiguity connected to the time series start point detracts 
from the forecast’s methodological validity. Along with this methodological problem, the 
Outlook lacks a detailed specification as to which econometric model is taken to produce data. 
Because econometrics models vary in theory and mathematical approach, without details 
clarifying how econometrics is used and which model is adopted for scenario building, the 
methodology undertaken must be clarified to understand how the energy data were determined. 
The assumptions made for supply-side analysis is also methodologically unstable as supply is 
assumed to match demand, but a rationalization for such an assumption is not offered. Energy- 
related policies implemented during the base year time were integrated into the forecast. When 
predicting energy consumption and production levels, this scenario does not consider energy-
related impacts except already established effects such as global warming. Also not included in 
the scenario development are any speculative technology improvements. IEA energy serves as the 
main data source for this outlook and is supplemented with data from the APEC energy database 
and direct data contributions from member experts and sources. Because external factors such as 
GDP and sector growth ultimately affect the energy balance, APEC commissioned DRI-WEFA to 
supply such projections. APEC gives no methodological detail as to how this organization 
approaches forecasting. DRI-WEFA was contracted to supply GDP and population forecasts for 
all member countries. The Asian Pacific Energy Research Center reasoned that input consistency 
is necessary for scenario building, so used an outside source for input forecasting instead of 
basing the scenario on official government predictions. Energy forecasts are structured along the 
standard format for Energy Balance Tables (EBT), which includes all energy sectors as well as 
major energy forms. Some modifications were made to the EBT format: Coal and coal products 
fall under the category “Coal,” crude oil and petroleum products are combined under “Oil” and 
natural gas and town gas are referred to as “Gas.” In text and tables, “natural gas” is used to refer 
to the primary energy, in an effort to maintain clarity. 
 
Results 
Because the APEC Outlook connects energy developments to economic and population growth, 
economic growth prospects and population changes are also factored into the energy scenario. 
Within the Asian Pacific Economic region, China maintains the highest economic projection for 
1999-2020, at 7.2% per year and a 2.7% energy consumption rate. The outlook bases such a 
projection on domestic demand and foreign investments, both of which are hastened by the 
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country’s WTO accession. Chinese population levels are expected to decrease in the next two 
decades, falling from 0.7% per year from 1.1% growth in the previous decade. The APEC 
Outlook builds an energy scenario according to the assumption that energy production and 
consumption is driven by economic growth, so data is developed against the energy required to 
support China’s projected economic growth. Although this scenario examines total energy 
consumption, the outlook also breaks down consumption levels along specialized areas: 
industrial, transport, and residential sectors. China’s industrial sectors are projected to consume 
roughly 601 Mtoe Equivalent in 2020, with an energy intensity projected to decline at 4.2% per 
year from 1999 to 2020. Energy consumption in China’s transport sector is measured at 205 Mtoe 
by 2020. In other words, the Outlook predicts a 5.3% yearly growth rate for the next two decades. 
The APEC Outlook further separates energy consumption in the transport sector along modes of 
transportation. Energy consumption from road transport is forecasted to grow annually at the rate 
of 4.9%; air transport at 7.8%; marine transport at 6.8%; and rail transport, with the slowest 
energy growth rate, at 4.7% p.a.. In the past, energy consumption in China’s residential and 
commercial sector was predominantly centered on coal usage, but in the forecast period, coal 
demand is expected to decline. Along with a decrease in coal consumption, natural gas reliance 
should increase from 4.8 Mtoe in 1999 to 24 Mtoe in 2020. As previously stated, the scenario 
paints an energy intensity decrease from all social sectors, and according to this scenario, energy 
intensity is predicted to decrease overall from 3.7 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) per million U.S. 
dollars in 1980 to 0.5 toe/million $ in 2020. According to APEC, the country’s rapid economic 
growth and shift into energy-efficient technology utilization spurs the fall in energy intensity. Oil 
production is predicted to fall slightly in the next twenty years, while the Outlook expects China’s 
coal production to grow annually by 2.4%. In conjunction with slight growth in coal production 
levels, Chinese coal exports are also expected to jump from 25 Mtoe in 1999 to 67 Mtoe in 2020.  
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Natural Gas in Asia, The Challenges of Growth in China, India, Japan, and Korea: Natural Gas in 
China 
 
Results 
Because this study is not intended as a detailed natural gas forecast, the methodological approach 
used to generate expenditure figures is not outlined. Rather, this study presents an overview to 
developments focusing upon augmenting the natural gas share in the market. In the process, this 
study questions China’s target of 10% natural gas consumption in the overall energy balance. 
While 10% remains a relatively minor share in China’s overall energy mix, such a percentage 
translates into a large absolute volume, amounting to roughly 200 billion cubic meters (bcm). 
This figure is reached by using primary energy consumption in 2000 (1.27 billion tonnes of coal 
equivalent) and assuming 2.5 to 3.5% annual growth in primary energy consumption for the next 
20 years. The author cites Chinese geologists pointing to the potential for natural gas expansion. 
The second national survey for petroleum and natural gas resources in 1994 is used as the basis 
for current estimates. This survey claims that 48% of sedimentary areas have yet to be explored 
for natural gas pockets. PetroChina, however, plans to increase gas reserves by 1.9 to 2.3 trillion 
m3 by 2010. Along with conventional natural gas resources, China also possesses stores of coal-
bed methane (CBM). While the country has set CBM production targets to 3-4 bcm in 2005, 10 
bcm in 2010, and 20 bcm in 2015, geographic complexity and technology incompatibility may 
bar China from reaching its planned yields. In 2020, natural gas production is not expected to 
satisfy consumption levels with potential shortfall ranging from 10 to 108 bcm. Production 
projections are based on expansions of proven gas reserves. This study estimates demand to range 
from 75 to 80 bcm in 2010. The author points out that international sources place 2010 demand 
on a higher level at 120 bcm, so when comparing such demand estimates to China’s planned 70 
bcm production figure, import figures could range from 0 to 50 bcm. The dimensions of the 
natural gas industry for the next decade are already shaped. This outlook suggests the 
combination of an immature gas industry, emergence of  new policies and plans at the end of the 
1990’s and beginning of 2000 positions the country in a “learning phase” in which market, 
institutional, and infrastructure development, along with international interchange paves the road 
for supply capacity and industry expansion. In the next decade natural gas will remain a domestic 
concern as reserves are increased and new gas fields are discovered. But if the country wants to 
widen its market beyond domestic supply supported by imported LNG, as reflected in the “slow 
growth” scenario, China must build fixed links to international gas fields. Such a strategy calls for 
long term bilateral or multilateral contracts with foreign regions. Without international pipelines, 
growth in the natural gas production will be limited to 100 bcm in 2020. Another challenge China 
confronts for natural gas expansion is acquiring a sufficient market to utilize supplies at gas 
prices equaling those found in industrialized countries. The study concludes by emphasizing the 
need for multiple external supply lines for China to reach its 10% natural gas share. 
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Energy Information Agency (EIA) International Energy Outlook 2003 
 
Methodology 
Published and compiled by the Energy Information Administration (USA), the International 
Energy Outlook 2003 presents energy consumption forecasts of industrialized and developing 
nations. Projections for all countries, including China extend to 2020. The outlook offers three 
energy scenarios for the next two decades. Using the System for the Analysis of Global Economy 
Markets (SAGE) as the forecasting model, a reference case or baseline scenario is established. 
High and low economic growth forecasts are based on the reference case scenario. Because 
China’s economic progress in the last decade reflected rapid advancement, the possibility for an 
extreme downturn also arises. Using this reasoning, 2.5% is subtracted from the reference case 
growth rate to represent a low economic growth. For a high economic growth scenario, 1.0% is 
added to the reference case figure. Economic growth, for this outlook, drives energy consumption 
activities. The outlook measures growth in terms of GDP and uses projected data supplied by 
Global Insight Inc. Because the outlook does not offer further information regarding the 
forecasted GDP figures, the specific approach Global Insight Inc. uses to project future GDP 
numbers is not clarified. Unlike the GDP projections, the model through which the reference case 
energy consumption data are reached is fully detailed. The SAGE model, a more complex version 
of the well-used MARKAL model, is also a partial equilibrium, technology explicit model. 
SAGE integrates a set of regional models providing a technology-rich foundation for estimating 
regional energy consumption. A reference case projection is generated for each region using 42 
end-use energy service demands. These factors are developed through economic and 
demographic projections. How energy consumption patterns can meet energy demands are 
considered in terms of the region’s existing energy use patterns, existing energy-use equipment, 
characteristics of available new technologies, and new primary energy sources. Energy-relevant 
government policies implemented by October 1, 2002 were used for the reference case forecast. 
SAGE figures regional energy services at least cost by simultaneously making equipment 
investment/operating decisions with primary energy supply decisions. This is completed using 
“period-by-period, market simulation.” 
 
Results 
Chinese GDP growth is forecasted to undergo a 6.2% average annual growth rate. The outlook 
forecasts energy consumption to increase at an average annual rate of 3.8%. Were China to 
experience high economic growth, this figure would increase by 0.7% and on the occasion the 
country suffers from low economic development, energy consumption is projected to fall to 2.1% 
per year. According to the IEO outlook, oil demand has and will continue to climb, predicted to 
increase annually at 3.3%. By 2025, China will consume 10.9 MMbbl/d, much of this oil is 
projected to be imported. The predicted rise in oil consumption is intimately connected to the 
forecasted transport growth. Almost all projected escalations in petroleum product reliance and 
two third increments of China’s predicted oil demand are fueled by transport. Road transport will 
have the largest impact on oil consumption for the next two decades. Air transport is projected as 
the second highest growth area in the transport sector. The outlook expects natural gas demand to 
grow most within developing nations, including China. Increases in natural gas reliance are 
connected to electricity generation. The outlook also predicts natural gas to displace home 
heating and booking fuels in Chinese cities such as Shanghai and Beijing. The Chinese 
government, partially motivated by the Beijing 2008 Olympics, is pursuing natural gas 
production, transportation, and importation. Already, PetroChina has built the West-to-East 
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pipeline, extending from the gas rich Tarim Basin, Xinjiang to Shanghai. The eastern side came 
online in 2003 and the western half was scheduled for launch in October 2004. The country is 
negotiating with Russia for an annual 700 billion cubic feet gas import through an extension of 
the West-to-East. This natural gas exchange, from Russia’s Kovyta field, may begin in 2008. 
Coal consumption in the forecasted period is dominated by China and India. China is expected to 
fulfill much of the increased energy demand through coal, especially in the industrial and 
electrical sectors. In 2001, 62% of the coal used in China was for non-electricity purposes. 
However, such heavy coal reliance from the industrial sector is forecasted to decline to 52% by 
2025. Dependence on coal for electricity generation, which is not explored in this paper, is 
predicted to increase every year by 4.2%. Along with domestic coal reliance, the outlook also 
predicts China to account for a significant portion of Asian coal imports. Chinese import figures 
could result in a potentially higher figure, but this outlook forecasts that projected increase will be 
satisfied by domestic production. China is forecasted to use 19 GW (Gigawatts) of nuclear power 
in 2020. 
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Energy Policy Journal (EPJ): Future Implications of China’s Energy-Technology Choices 
 
Methodology 
For this study, technology scenarios are used to explore China’s evolving energy system, so 
developing a forecast for China’s energy expenditures is not the main purpose. Because the 
modeling system used in scenario building calls for energy inputs, the study produces energy 
production and consumption data for China’s future. For the study, a MARKet-ALlocation 
(MARKAL) energy-system model was constructed for China and used to analyze alternative 
technology strategies China could adopt from 1995-2050 to diminish the country’s growing 
energy challenges. This MARKAL model is a linear programming model identifying the 
technological configuration for an energy system. This study develops two technology scenarios 
for China’s energy landscape. The first model runs a “Base” set of energy conversions, energy-
based technologies currently available or at advanced development stages. This business as usual 
scenario examines the results of a country following along current energy-supply technology 
trends in which technology is slowly improved. The second scenario adds the “Advanced” set of 
energy conversion into the modeling process. Technologies still in the research and development 
phase are categorized as “Advanced.” This scenario is constructed to examine China when 
leapfrogging upgrades are included in the energy system. Both scenarios are overlaid with one or 
more constraints: limits on SO2 emissions; oil and natural gas imports; and CO2 emissions limits. 
So, four sub-results are developed from the two overarching scenarios. In the MARKAL model, 
costs, maximum supply of primary energy resources, the cost/performance characteristics of 
alternative conversion technologies for processing primary energy sources, the cost/performance 
characteristics of alternative end-use technologies, must be specified. The authors projected 
energy demand by comparing historical data for OECD countries at similar per capita GDP 
levels. By assuming China to expand energy services that match the level achieved by OECD 
regions in the mid-1990’s, the authors were able to make energy estimates for the next five 
decades. Demand for energy services is tied to planned, future economic growth. Energy 
production estimates represent the absolute limit on annual production as specified in the 
MARKAL model, but is not necessarily the level at which the resources are used in the model. 
Factors connected to energy growth such as forecasted GDP and population patterns are based on 
baseline data from China’s State Economic Information Center. The authors made low GDP 
projection based on recent trends in China’s energy expenditures. While the study does not 
present specific figures for future energy consumption, the MARKAL model does generate an 
outlook for future energy demand, differentiating energy consumption in primary fossil fuel 
sectors based on the two scenarios.  
 
Results 
Forecasted GDP rates suggest 7.0% growth until 2005 and 5.5% increase from 2010 to 2025. The 
study projects population growth as ranging from 0.7% in 2005 to 0.43% in 2025. Between 1995 
and 2050 the study estimates energy service supply to more than triple. Energy intensity declines 
at 3.5% per annum. Projections of coal production show a 1.5% annual growth until 2050.  Oil 
production peaks at 180 Mt per year between 2015 and 2025, after which production is expected 
to fall around 100 Mt. Natural gas production growing through 2020, reaches a 170 Billion m3 
upper bound. Natural gas growth rate over this period averages 4.1% a year. Minimum installed 
nuclear capacity varies in projection from 19 GW to 216 GW in 2050. Projection is guided by 
recent investments in new exploration and current pipeline development. Coal is the dominate 
energy in BASE and B-SO2 scenarios. Primary energy use is lower in B-SO2 (Base scenario with 
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constraints on SO2 emissions) as compared to BASE due to substitution of coal with natural gas 
in the industrial sector. Oil and natural gas imports in BASE average 280 Mtoe 51 percent 
imports (China imported 65 Mtoe in 2000) B-SO2 scenario number decreased to 203 Mtoe. 
When carbon dioxide emissions are set to 80 GtC, natural gas and oil imports climb to 988 Mtoe 
in 2050. China under the “Advanced” scenario option, in comparison with the Base scenario 
cases, requires less oil and gas imports, in comparison with the country under the Base scenario. 
When further limits on SO2 and CO2 are imposed on the “Advanced” scenario, coal consumption 
experiences a reduction as renewable and alternative energies replace typically coal dominated 
services. The study makes a particular energy use comparison between the B-SO2 scenario (B 
scenario) and the A-S-O30-C66 (A scenario) upon which restrictions are set on SO2 and carbon 
dioxide emissions are limited to 66GtC. According to this comparison, primary energy use in 
scenario B grows to 110 EJ in 2050. Energy use in scenario A grew faster to measure 139 EJ, but 
fossil fuel consumption is 8 EJ lower than the B scenario. China, under scenario B, continues to 
be dominated by coal consumption, consisting of 64% of the energy balance at the end of the next 
five decades. While coal reliance in scenario A is not starkly different, direct coal use is 
significantly decreased as compared to direct coal dependence in scenario B. In scenario A, 
industry, residential, and commercial coal use diminishes, but coal use for electricity generation 
increases considerably to 56% by 2050. Oil and natural gas consumption’s contribution to the 
energy balance remain largely unchanged under scenario B. The study predicts oil production to 
peak in 2020, so oil imports in scenario B will reach 320 mt by 2050 accounting for 76% of oil 
use. Scenario B also predicts natural gas imports to grow in 2010 where 56% of gas used will be 
imported. But, due to heavy coal dependence and oil imports, natural gas consumption is not 
expected to grow after 2035, spurring an import reduction. From a scenario A perspective, the 
share of oil and natural gas in China’s energy mix drops from 21% in 1995 to 13% in 2050. The 
diminished oil dependency stems from installing oil-efficient vehicles in the transport sector, a 
transition from conventional vehicles to hybrid-electric cars, and adopting fuel cell vehicles 
operating on coal-based hydrogen. Natural gas demand intensifies in scenario A, requiring the 
country to import 30% of its supply from external sources. Regardless of the scenario case, the 
study cites energy use in the transport sector to increase drastically. The proportion of private 
transport in passenger transport is expected to amount to 32% with 10 to 15% of the population 
owning cars in 2050. 
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Energy Policy Journal (EPJ): An Econometric Study on China’s Economy, Energy, and 
Environment to the Year 2030 
 
Methodology 
This study considers China’s energy development against an economic and environmental 
background. Predictions of China’s energy demand and supply are generated from an integrated, 
econometric model (the 3E’ Model) composed of a macroeconomic sub-model, an energy sub-
model, and an environment sub-model. The macroeconomic sub-model provides economic 
indicators impacting the energy balance and uses population, fiscal policy, and overseas 
economic indicators. The core of the 3E’s Model, the energy sub-model, is used to determine 
energy flow from final energy consumption to primary energy supply and energy trading 
position. Based on economic activity and price indicators from the macroeconomic sub-model, 
the energy sub-model establishes final energy demand according to sector and energy source. 
Primary energy consumption is acquired through aggregating energy needs from end-use and 
transformation sectors. The environment sub-model establishes energy-related production 
matrices and SO2 and CO2 matrices which follow the energy balance table. The 3E’s model uses 
631 equations: 81 in the macro sub-model and 550 for energy and environment sub-models. Data 
for the macro indicators were based on figures from the China Statistical Yearbook, China Fixed 
Asset Investment Statistical Yearbook, China Labor Statistical Yearbook, China Environment 
Yearbook, World Development Indicators, and other official statistics. When indicators were not 
accessible via consistent sources, estimations based on irregular statistical reports, research 
papers, etc were made. Energy data for this study is primarily pulled from IEA. Because this 
model heavily depends on data, the reliability of official Chinese data is problematic. GDP data 
from Chinese sources are frequently overestimated, while energy balance numbers are regularly 
underestimated. This study takes into account the tendency of underestimating energy data, but 
the overstatement of GDP growth is not addressed. Assuming current economic trends to 
continue until 2030, a Business as Usual (BAU) case for macroeconomic simulation is 
constructed, A BAU and five alternative scenario perspectives for China’s energy balance is 
developed from the macroeconomic BAU case. The five alternative cases explore the following 
circumstances: energy savings; change to non-fossil fuels; energy savings and fuel switching, a 
carbon tax case, and a comprehensive scenario assuming all three conditions to take place.  
 
Results 
This study assumes China to support a rapid economic growth pace, with GDP potentially 
growing annually at 7%. According to the author, the technology factor will influence economic 
growth and its contribution will increase from 50% to 64%. In the forecast period from 1999 to 
2030, total primary energy consumption in the BAU case will grow 3.6% per year, although 
energy intensity is predicted to decline by 2.5% every year. The share of coal in the primary 
energy consumption mix is expected to fall from 71% in 1999 to 53% in 2030, while natural gas 
consumption may rise from 3.0% to 10.5%. Oil consumption is also expected to grow, as 
compared to natural gas consumption rates, although at a smaller scale from 23.3% in 1999 to 
28.4% in 2030. The study suggests nuclear energy to grow on a yearly basis at 13.7%. Natural 
gas is the main energy source which will replace coal in power generation for the next few 
decades. In terms of energy consumption by sector, the amount of energy used by the industry 
sector is expected to diminish. In 1999, industry accounted for 62% of the energy consumed, 
although by 2030, this percentage should fall to 41.9%. Due to better living conditions and a 
growing motorization process, transport energy consumption will hit 18.5%, as compared to 
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12.8% in 1999. When energy security is taken into consideration with the BAU scenario, a 
shortfall in fossil fuel supply measuring 710Mtoe will arise. When energy savings are factored 
into the BAU case, primary energy consumption is forecasted to be 4.8% lower and fuel imports 
are also expected to decline from 710 Mtoe to 661 Mtoe. By expanding its non-fossil fuel power 
generating capacity (fuel switching case), the country can lower fossil fuel consumption rates by 
7.0% every year. When both energy security and fuel switching are incorporated into the BAU 
case, not only will fuel imports decline, but primary energy consumption will annually drop by 
6.2%. In the case that a carbon tax is implemented on energy consumption from 2011, compared 
to BAU scenario results, primary energy consumption will decrease by 7.3% and fossil fuel 
consumption will fall by 8.0%, annually. Despite the drop in energy consumption, this scenario 
forecasts fuel import to rise from the 710 Mtoe in the BAU scenario to 729 Mtoe. This 
discrepancy occurs due to the high carbon content in coal, which compels a heavier reliance on 
oil and natural gas, both of which are less abundant in China. The final case in this study factors 
in energy security, energy switching, and a carbon tax, resulting in a 13.5% energy consumption 
decrease with fossil fuel consumption to fall by 19.9%. Energy import is also lower in the 
scenario, measured at 676 Mtoe when compared to the 710 Mtoe shortfall forecasted in the BAU 
case.  
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Coal Production                   
Source           Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
       Mt   1688-1742 1850-1926   
Japan Center for International Exchange: Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia Median   1715 1812   
 
World Bank: China Issues & Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control   Mt       2220 
 
World Bank: China Issues & Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control            
HIGH SUBSTITUTION         Mt       1915 
 
Energy Policy: Future Implications of China's Energy-Technology Choices   Mt 1669 1823 1986 2167 
 
Energy Policy: An Econometric Study of China’s Economy, Energy, and Environment to 2030 Mtoe   836.3     1071.7 
Asian Pacific Energy Research Center: APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002 Mtoe 744.8 825.8 922.1 1053.6 
 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook 2000     Mtoe   940   1192 
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Coal Consumption                    
Source           Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003    Mst 1442 1811 2115 2511 
REFERENCE CASE SCENARIO       Mt 
         
1308.16 
         
1706.41 
           
1918.7 
        
2646.26 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003    Mst 1463 1925 2334 2876 
HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH       Mt 
          
1327.21 1746.41 
            
1918.7 2646.26 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003    Mst 1346 1459 1586 1643 
LOW ECONOMIC GROWTH         Mt 
         
1221.07 
        
1323.58 
            
1438.80 
        
1490.50 
       Mt   1400-14500 1805-1876   
Japan Center for International Exchange: Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia   Median   1425 1835.5   
World Bank: China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control  Mt       3100 
 
Energy Policy: An Econometric Study of China’s Economy, Energy, and Environment to 2030  Mtoe   835  1072 
 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook 2000      Mtoe   864   1107 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Center: APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002   Mtoe 
            
699.2 
               
765.3 
            
859.9 989.61 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation: Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China and Japan Mtoe 
            
872.6 
              
875.9     
 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation: Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China and Japan           
HIGH GROWTH CASE         Mtoe 885.2 
                   
937.9     
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Oil Production                      
Source             Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
        Mt   185-195 200-210   
Japan Center for International Cooperation: Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia   Median   190 205   
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003     Mbbl/day 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 
REFERENCE CASE           Mt 174.251 179.23 174.251 174.251 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003     Mbbl/day 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8 
HIGH OIL PRICE CASE           Mt 179.23 184.208 184.208 188.668 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003     Mbbl/day 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 
LOW OIL PRICE CASE           Mt 169.2724 174.251 169.2724 164.294 
  
Energy Policy: An Econometric Study of China’s Economy, Energy, and Environment to 2030   Mtoe  177.8  212.4 
 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Agency 2000 TPES     Mtoe   371   541 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Center: APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002     Mtoe 
                   
260.3 328.3 
 
                  
403.6 497.2 
Japan Bank For International Cooperation: Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China & Japan Mtoe 
 
182.8 201.9     
 
Energy Policy: Future Implications of China's Energy Technology Choices     Mtoe 167 176 183 183 
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Oil Consumption                     
Source             Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
        Mt   275-298 325-355   
Japan Center for International Cooperation: Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia   Median   286.5 340   
 
World Bank: China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control   Mt       440 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003     Mt 273.823 323.609 383.3522 467.9884 
 
Energy Policy: An Econometric Study of China’s Economy, Energy, and Environment to 2030 Mtoe  316.9  487.5 
 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook 2000      Mtoe   335   488 
 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation: Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China and Japan Mtoe 196 244.6     
 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation: Energy Balance Simulations to 2010 for China and Japan           
HIGH GROWTH CASE           Mtoe 211.1 280.1     
 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Center: APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002    Mtoe 260.3 328.3 403.6 497.2 
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Natural Gas Production                   
Source          Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
 
Energy Policy: Future Implications of China's Energy-Technology Choices   Gm3 56 75 92 109 
       Gm3 40-45 54-73   92-110 
Natural Gas in Asia: Natural Gas in China       Median 42 64   101 
       Gm3   58-68 90-110   
Japan Center for International Cooperation: Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia Median   63 100   
 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Center: APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002   Mtoe 46.9 68.8 98.7 137.5 
 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook 2000         Mtoe   56   111 
  
  Mtoe   76.1   123.9 
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Natural Gas Consumption                   
Source           Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
 
Natural Gas in Asia: Natural Gas in China                
SLOW GROWTH         Gm3 41 70   120 
 
Natural Gas in Asia: Natural Gas in China               
 ACCELERATION AND LIBERALIZATION       Gm3 48 105   200 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003             
REFERENCE CASE         Gm3 39.644 65.129 107.604 127.423 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003             
LOW ECONOMIC GROWTH         Gm3 36.812 48.139 59.465 113.267 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003            
HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH       Gm3 39.643 73.624 121.762 152.911 
       Bm3   75-90 150-200   
Japan Center for International Cooperation: Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia Median   82.5 175   
 
World Bank: China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control Gm3       115 
 
Asia Pacific Energy Research Center: APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 200      Mtoe 46.9 68.8 98.7 137.5 
 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook 2000      Mtoe   49   97 
 
  Mtoe   79.7   163.5 
 
 
 
 62
 
 
Nuclear Production                     
Source             Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
 
Asian Pacific Energy Research Center: APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 2002  Mtoe 16.9 24 31 38.8 
 
International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook 2000       Mtoe   52   57 
        Mtce       72 
World Bank: China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control   Mtoe       50.4 
 
World Bank: China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control  Mtce       198 
HIGH SUBSTITUTION           Mtoe       138.6 
 
 
 
Nuclear Consumption                   
Source           Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003             
 REFERENCE CASE         GW 57,000 66,000 129,000 131,000 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003              
LOW ECONOMIC GROWTH         GW 57,000 66,000 125,000 122,000 
 
Energy Information Administration: International Energy Outlook 2003             
 HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH         GW 57,000 67,000 137,000 145,000 
  
 GW  41,230  82,460 
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